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citizenship transmission laws—creates a white heteropatriarchal property right
in philandering, sexual exploitation, and rape (the “WHP”). Section 1409
governs the transmission of citizenship from United States citizens to their
children, where the child is born abroad, outside of marriage, and one parent is a
citizen and the other is not. Section 1409, however, draws a distinct gender
distinction between women and men: An unwed female American citizen who
births a child outside the United States, fathered by a foreign man, automatically
transmits citizenship to her child. An unwed male American citizen, by contrast,
who fathers a child abroad with a foreign woman has the distinctly male
prerogative to either grant or deny citizenship to his foreign-born nonmarital
child at his leisure.
† Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.A., Vassar College. J.D.,
University of Michigan School of Law. Assistant United States Attorney, 2005-2014, U.S. Department of
Justice. I would like to thank Jon Weinberg, Christopher Lund, Sarah Abramowicz, Justin Long, Lance
Gable, Bryan Kent Wallace, Rebecca Robichaud, Rachel Settlage, Sabrina Balgamwalla, Natsu Taylor
Saito, Stewart Chang, Leti Volpp, and Joseph Singer for their helpful comments on previous drafts. I must
also extend my sincere gratitude to Lauren Madison, Jacqueline Yee, and Henry Schneider, my tireless,
loyal, and hardworking research assistants. I must also thank my librarian, Michelle LaLonde, for her
tireless research efforts, thorough attention to detail, and prompt responses. I also want to extend my
sincere gratitude to my Administrative Assistant, Rhonda Agnew, a brilliant and kind woman. Any errors
are mine. Finally, and most importantly, for my parents, who possessed the profound courage to love
across the racial divide, free from black and yellow hypersexualization and negation. Your capacity of
heart is my enduring blessing. I dedicate this piece to the inestimable number of American children
abandoned by their American fathers abroad. I hope this Article does some modicum of justice for you.
58 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 31:1
On the surface, it might appear that § 1409 treats men and women differently
because it is easy to determine a child’s mother, as opposed to a child’s father,
at birth. In fact, a majority of the Supreme Court has deployed these “natural”
differences between men and women to shield § 1409 from three separate
gender-based equal protection challenges. Justice Ginsburg, however, has keenly
observed, “[H]istory reveals what lurks behind § 1409.” What lurks behind
§ 1409 is a long legacy of white heteropatriarchy deploying the legal category of
citizenship to perfect sovereignty
1
in itself and vulnerability in “foreign” women
for the very purpose of sexual domination.
The historical model for this racialized regime of sexual domination is the
classic case of Dred Scott,
2
where the denial of citizenship to anyone of African
descent further facilitated a white heteropatriarchal property right in
philandering, sexual exploitation, and rape. In Dred Scott, the exclusion of
anyone of African descent from personhood, through the legal mechanism of
citizenship, perfected power in white men and vulnerability in racialized others.
By excluding anyone of African descent from citizenship, enslaved owners
continued to enjoy an unbridled property right in the use and enjoyment of the
enslaved. The denial of citizenship to the enslaved facilitated their use as
property. Following suit, § 1409 makes citizenship the property of men, through
which they can exclude their nonmarital foreign-born children frommembership
in the American polity. Section 1409 vests in these fathers not just a right to
exclude their children, but to discard them, leaving them profoundly vulnerable
to the sting of “illegitimacy,” ethnic and racial animus, and financial precarity—
a form of destruction, while simultaneously empowering these fathers to sexually
possess, control, use, and enjoy foreign women. Section 1409 understands all too
well: in order to sexually exploit the mother, one must control the status of the
child.
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militarism and sexual tourism have much in common: Each has





has argued, this footprint is an inestimable number of children
that American men have fathered and abandoned around the world.
6
On the
streets of Olongapo, Philippines alone, the home of a former American naval
base, countless abandoned Amerasian children are reduced to prostitution and
crime.
7
Far from innocence, accident, or some act of nature, these children are
the products of centuries of American imperialism, lawmakers, judges,
administrators, military men, and sexual tourists, who, taken together, reflect a
societal policy that creates supremacy by making property of others.
3. I use the terms “American” and “America” deliberately, not to insult the other countries with
whom America shares a hemisphere, but to shed light on the irony of “America” as a bastion of freedom
and equality contrasted with the underlying thesis of historical denigration in this Article.
4. Sex trafficking is a global problem. As of September 2017, 24.9 million people were trafficked
each year; of these, over seventy percent were women and girls. Fact Sheet: Human Trafficking by the
Numbers, HUM. RTS. FIRST (2017), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/Trafficking
bytheNumbers.pdf [https://perma.cc/ERX7-JLSJ]. Estimates vary, but trafficking for the purpose of
sexual exploitation could drive as much as seventy-nine percent of all human trafficking. Policy Analysis
& Research Branch,Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, U.N. OFF.ONDRUGS&CRIME (Feb. 2009),
http://www.unodc.org/documents/Global_Report_on_TIP.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BND-DHXL]. The
trafficking of women and children is frequently reported as the world’s fastest-growing crime. See, e.g.,
Morgan Brinlee, 13 Sex Trafficking Statistics That Put The Worldwide Problem Into Perspective, BUSTLE
(July 30, 2018), https://www.bustle.com/p/13-sex-trafficking-statistics-that-put-the-worldwide-problem-
into-perspective-9930150 [https://perma.cc/8ADW-KJ3P]. But see Fact Sheet, supra (estimating that sex
trafficking comprises nineteen percent of all human trafficking).
5. This Article relies heavily on Kristin Collins’s trailblazing, comprehensive, and brilliant work on
citizenship transmission laws. This piece, however, is the first treatment of § 1409 that applies a Critical
Race Feminist lens and property rubric to § 1409. In doing so, this piece highlights the white
heteropatriarchal operations of § 1409, which, as I argue throughout this article, creates a white
heteropatriarchal property right in philandering, sexual, exploitation, and rape. This Article centralizes the
role of power, as it is raced, classed, and gendered in order to expose the ways in which the sexual
exploitation of foreign women becomes the routinized practice of a highly industrial nation, namely the
United States, through § 1409.
6. It is impossible to know how many children American men have abandoned abroad. See
Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction of Family,
Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134, 2212 (2014). In an act of willful blindness, no government
bureaucracy maintains records of the nonmarital foreign-born children discarded by their American
fathers. Just the numbers of nonmarital foreign-born children in Asia from American servicemen alone
varies based on the source. See Amerasian Immigration Proposals: Hearing on S. 1698 Before the
Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 63 (1982)
(statement of Alfred Keane, Dir., Americans for International Aid) (estimating between 30,000 and 80,000
Amerasians in Southeast Asia); JOHN SHADE, AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN CHILDREN: THE AMERASIANS 15
(1981) (estimating the number of Amerasians born in Vietnam at between 20,000 and 100,000); Collins,
Illegitimate Borders, supra, at 2212 n.308 (“Estimates vary significantly, from 20,000 to more
than 200,000.”). John Shade suggests that by 1952 over 200,000 children had been born in Japan to
American servicemen. SHADE, supra, at 24. If that is true, the number of children born to servicemen in
Asia in the second half of the twentieth century could be closer to 300,000.
7. JosephM. Ahern,Out of Sight, Out ofMind: United States Immigration Law and Policy as Applied
to Filipino-Amerasians, 1 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 105, 108 (1992).
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Collectively, these actors have decided that mass destruction is worth the price
of a frolic.
Vulnerability is the lynchpin of exploitation.
8
Historically, white
heteropatriarchy—that is, power as it is raced, classed, sexed, and gendered
9
—
has deployed the legal mechanism of citizenship to perfect sovereignty in itself
and vulnerability in others for the specific purpose of sexual exploitation. Title 8,
United States Code, § 1409 is a variation of this scheme. It is a biopower (or a
legal mechanism) that subjugates the bodies of women for both sexual pleasure
and racial purity, all the while exerting control over populations.
10
Section 1409 regulates the transmission of citizenship from American
citizens to their nonmarital, foreign-born children.
11
Section 1409, however,
draws an explicit gender distinction based on the sex of the parents: An unwed
citizen mother, who has a child abroad with a foreign man, transmits citizenship
automatically to her child. By contrast, an unwed citizen father who fathers a
child abroad with a foreign woman has the prerogative to transfer citizenship to
his child and, if he so desires, to complete a process to do so, which includes
agreeing in writing to provide financial support to his child until the child is
eighteen years old.
12
Many have argued that § 1409 treats citizen fathers and mothers differently
because it is relatively simple to determine a child’s mother, as opposed to the
father at birth. The Supreme Court has, in fact, used this “natural,” “biological,”
and “physiological” distinction between men and women to immunize § 1409
from three distinct gender-based equal protection challenges.
13
Despite
8. See generally Blanche Bong Cook, Stop Traffic: Using Expert Witnesses to Disrupt Intersectional
Vulnerability in Sex Trafficking Prosecutions, 24 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 147 (2019) (arguing that the
creating and sustaining of vulnerability are necessary ingredients for sexual exploitation, at the individual
level of traffickers as well as the routinized operations of highly industrial nations, like the United States).
9. “White heteropatriarchy” refers to a racialized system of power and control based on white
supremacy, compulsory heterosexuality, patriarchy, and an imposed gender-binary system. Blanche Bong
Cook, Biased and Broken Bodies of Proof: White Heteropatriarchy, the Grand Jury Process, and
Performance on Unarmed Black Flesh, 85 UMKC L. REV. 567, 573 (2017).
10. Biopower is literally having power over other bodies, “an explosion of numerous and diverse
techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations.” 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT,
THEHISTORYOF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 139-40 (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books ed. 1990)
(1979) (“The old power of death that symbolized sovereign power was now carefully supplanted by the
administration of bodies and the calculated management of life . . . in the field of political practices and
economic observation, of the problems of birthrate, longevity, public health, housing, and migration.”).
11. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163, 235-36, 238-39, §§ 301, 309, 8
U.S.C. §§ 1401-1409.
12. Id. § 1409(a), 1409(c) (2018).
13. See Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (evenly split per curiam)
(affirming lower court rejection of gender equal protection challenge to the physical presence requirement
in § 1409); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 65 (2001) (stating “[g]iven the 9–month interval between
conception and birth, it is not always certain that a father will know that a child was conceived, nor is it
always clear that even the mother will be sure of the father’s identity”); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420,
436 (1998) (Stevens, J.) (plurality opinion) (upholding legitimation against gender based equal protection
challenge for several reasons, including it ensured reliable proof of paternity, stating, “There is no doubt
that ensuring reliable proof of a biological relationship between the potential citizen and its citizen parent
is an important governmental objective”).
62 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 31:1
technologically advanced paternity testing, like DNA testing, § 1409 continues
to thrive on antiquated justifications about the “natural” and “biological”
differences between men and women—presumptions that scholars have
universally denounced as “sexist, narrow-minded, and patently conservative.”
14
So why does § 1409—with its explicit gender disparity between unwed
citizen fathers and mothers when sexually active abroad in foreign places—
continue to endure?
15
As Justice Ginsburg shrewdly noted, “[H]istory reveals
what lurks behind § 1409.”
16
What lurks behind § 1409 is a long legacy of white
heteropatriarchy deploying the legal mechanism of citizenship to perfect
sovereignty in itself and vulnerability in racialized and “foreign” others for the
purpose of sexual exploitation. The gender asymmetry in the transfer of
citizenship between men and women in § 1409 reflects norms that privilege and
protect male sexual prerogative outside of marriage while structurally supporting
the creation and maintenance of vulnerability for purposes of sexual exploitation
in foreign women.
17
More concretely, § 1409 creates a white heteropatriarchal
property right in philandering, sexual exploitation, and rape (the WHP).
Under § 1409, Congress, with the Supreme Court’s blessing, conferred a
property right to citizen men in the form of citizenship. Under this particular
form of citizenship, citizen men have a property right to either grant or deny
citizenship to their nonmarital foreign-born children. The prerogative to grant or
deny citizenship functions like property. Section 1409 confers to citizen men a
package of entitlements, a bundle of rights, that includes the right to exclude,
transfer, destroy, possess, control, use, and enjoy.
18
Under § 1409, citizen men
have a right to exclude their nonmarital foreign-born children from the American
polity. By bestowing citizen fathers with the right to exclude their children from
citizenship, § 1409 entitles these fathers to abandon their children, leaving them
profoundly vulnerable to the sting of “illegitimacy,”
19
ethnic and racial hatred,
20
14. Albertina Antognini, From Citizenship to Custody: Unwed Fathers Abroad and at Home, 36
HARV. J. L. & GENDER 405, 407 (2013) (quoting Laura Weinrib, Protecting Sex: Sexual Disincentives
and Sex-Based Discrimination in Nguyen v. INS, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER&L. 222, 245-50 (2003)).
15. Other scholars have attempted to answer this question. See Kristin A. Collins, A Short History of
Sex and Citizenship: The Historians’ Amicus Brief in Flores-Villar v. United States, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1485,
1487 (2011); Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2137-38 (“At formative moments in the
development of American nationality law, gender- and marriage-based domestic relations laws were
enlisted by administrators, judges, and legislators to deny the citizenship claims of nonwhite children,
especially those who were excludable under the race-based immigration and naturalization laws.”).
16. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2017).
17. See Collins, A Short History, supra note 15, at 1495 (“By restricting derivative citizenship as
between Citizen fathers and their nonmarital foreign-born children, federal citizenship law perpetuates a
system of sexual ethics that privileges men’s sexual prerogative outside marriage.”).
18. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1731 (1993) [hereinafter
Harris,WAP] (describing the ways in which whiteness functions as property, in that whiteness conforms
to the general contours of property, including the rights of possession, use, disposition, transfer or
alienability, use and enjoyment, and most important, the absolute right to exclude).
19. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2167.
20. In criticizing the Dred Scott v. Sanford decision, upholding the constitutionality of antebellum
slavery, in 1857, then presidential candidate Abraham Lincoln stated, “There is a natural disgust in the
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and financial precarity
21
—a form of destruction and statelessness.
22
Section 1409
simultaneously invests in these fathers a biopower to continue the sexual
possession, control, use, and enjoyment of foreign women. (For more on this,
see Figure 1, p. 101.) Unprotected philandering, sexual exploitation, and rape,
liberated from parental responsibility,
23
are property interests that flow from
Congress’s grant of power to citizen men under § 1409. Section 1409 is where
American citizenship for men becomes indistinguishable from the right to
engage in hypermasculinity.
24
Although this may initially seem hyperbolic, once
minds of nearly all white people, to the idea of an indiscriminate amalgamation of the white and black
races.” ABRAHAM LINCOLN, From Speech on the Dred Scott Decision at Springfield, Illinois, in
SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 117, 119 (First Library of Am. Paperback Classic Edition 2009)
(speech given June 26, 1857). In the same speech, Lincoln again references “the amalgamation of the
races” as an “odium.” LINCOLN, supra.
21. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2167.
22. In 2014, upon recognizing that discrimination against either mothers or fathers in citizenship and
nationality laws is a major cause of statelessness, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) undertook a ten-year project to eliminate statelessness by 2024. See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR
REFUGEES, A SPECIAL REPORT: ENDING STATELESSNESS WITHIN 10 YEARS (Nov. 2010),
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/546217229.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CQR-H76S]; U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR
REFUGEES, THE CAMPAIGN TO END STATELESSNESS: APRIL 2016 UPDATE 1 (referring to speech of
UNHCR “highlight[ing] the issue of gender discrimination in the nationality laws of 27 countries—a
major cause of statelessness globally”), https://www.refworld.org/docid/571e23fb7.html
[https://perma.cc/NU4H-6DU7]; see also Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1697 (2017).
23. The determination of citizenship for foreign-born nonmarital children and parentage are two
separate legal matters. Both citizenship and parentage of foreign-born children can be determined
independently. Although citizenship and parentage are two separate legal matters, the absence of
citizenship is a deliberate obstacle and interference with the establishment of a parental relationship as a
practical matter. The absence of citizenship for the nonmarital foreign-born offspring makes it more
difficult pragmatically to take advantage of parental duties and support. Moreover, the absence of
citizenship inhibits the ability to establish a parental relationship.
24. See infra Figure 1, p. 101. Throughout this article, I use “hypermasculine sexual performance,”
“hypermasculine performance,” or “hypermasculinity” as a shorthand for “unprotected philandering,
sexual exploitation, and rape,” within the context of my analysis of § 1409. In addition, I use
“hypermasculinity” as primarily a performance of control over others. Drawing from Angela Harris,
hypermasculinity is the exaggerated performance of masculinity, enacted out of an anxiety about the status
of one’s manhood, and deployed in order to bring others under one’s domination and control through
sexual performance, humiliation, and sexualized physical violence. Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence,
Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777 (2000). As Harris states, “men achieve masculinity at
the expense of women.” Harris, supra, at 785. Hypermasculinity makes of bodies and persons “sites” for
the performance of their masculinity, as if to prove it—to inscribe it—permanently upon the flesh or
psyche of another. Harris demonstrates how the state is complicit in hypermasculinity through the
American military and police work, both of which are primary sites and practices for gender violence. As
Harris points out, fundamentally grounded in an “us” v. “them” culture, the police is “what street gangs
aspire to be: sovereign protectors of turf, defenders of the innocent, and possessors of a monopoly on
violence and moral authority” who “share a commitment to masculine ideals, moving within a culture of
honor in which respect must be paid or violence will follow.” Harris, supra, at 794-795. As Harris states,
“[M]ilitary work . . . offers individuals a chance at all the privileges of hegemonic masculinity in exchange
for embracing and excelling at the job.” Harris, supra, at 798. Harris, in conversation with Eve Kosofsky
Sedgwick, explicates the hypermasculinity of the American military as follows:
[T]he military is a place where both men’s manipulability and their capacity for violence is at
a premium. As is true elsewhere in the culture, the privileges of masculinity require that one
establish intimate relationships with other men; yet the very closeness of these bonds provokes
the terror of being marked homosexual and of losing one’s masculine privileges. The
instability of masculine identity under these circumstances makes insecure men easily
manipulable (anxious and eager to prove their masculinity) and potentially violent (for not
only status but also personal identity itself is at stake). The military both exemplifies and
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placed in a historical context of white heteropatriarchy’s use of citizenship to
both ensure racial purity and to create vulnerability for purposes of sexual
exploitation, this net result is undeniable.
25
Section 1409 is part of a long-enduring legacy of using the legal category of
citizenship, coupled with matrilineal succession (the status of the child following
that of the mother), to control women’s bodies for racial purity and sexual
pleasure. This practice dates back to antebellum slavery, but continues forward
to the sexual practices of the American military and sexual tourism.
26
Moreover,
the ability to control the legal status of the nonmarital child is vital to sexually
dominating, controlling, and exploiting the mother. The blueprint for § 1409’s
racialized regime of sexual domination is the classic case of Dred Scott,
27
where
the denial of citizenship to anyone of African descent further facilitated a white
heteropatriarchal property right in philandering, sexual exploitation, and rape. In
Dred Scott, the lethal trifecta of (1) excluding anyone of African descent from
personhood, through the legal mechanism of citizenship; (2) the continued
propertization of bodies; and (3) the rules of matrilineal succession outside
marriage—the status of the offspring of an enslaved woman and a white man
follows the status of the mother—perfected power in whitemen and vulnerability
in anyone of African descent. By excluding anyone of African descent from
citizenship, men, white men in particular, continued to enjoy a white
heteropatriarchal property right in the unbridled use and enjoyment of the
enslaved.
Following suit, § 1409 creates the WHP, a white heteropatriarchal property
right in philandering, sexual exploitation, and rape. Section 1409 creates a
property right that is “white” in that citizenship has been, and continues to be,
highly racialized. Historically, white heteropatriarchy has used the legal category
shrewdly exploits the internal structure of masculinity: Military culture, like prison culture,
both seeks to make men doubt their own masculinity and encourages them to prove their
manhood through violence and casual sexuality.
Id. at 787-88 (citation omitted). Throughout this piece, I discuss § 1409’s impact not just on the American
military, but also sexual conduct abroad, particularly sexual tourism. Thus, the use of hypermasculinity
has particular resonance within the military, but it also has application within the entire scene of sexual
tourism, as domination, subjugation, and performance are fundamentally a part of sexual exploitation.
25. Collins, A Short History, supra note 15, at 1496 (“Limitations on citizenship claims asserted by
or on behalf of the nonmarital foreign-born children of American fathers highlight the troubling practice
of sexual exploitation of non-white foreign women by white American men. If this suggestion strikes
some readers as speculative, consider the statement of Edwin Borchard, one of the most well-respected
citizenship law experts of the early Twentieth Century, who in 1912 uncritically declared that it ‘seems
clear that illegitimate half-castes born in semi-barbarous countries of American fathers and native women
are not American citizens.’” (quoting EDWINM.BORCHARD, THEDIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OFCITIZENS
ABROAD 612 (1915))).
26. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2152.
27. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; but see Joshua J. Schroeder, The Body Snatchers: How the Writ
of Habeas Corpus was Taken from the People of the United States, 35 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 60–61
(2016) (“But even today, when all of the Justices symbolically express disgust over Dred Scott the U.S.
Supreme Court still has not expressly overruled Dred Scott or explained why its approach fails
constitutional muster.”).
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of citizenship to make America white—synonymous with whiteness—to make
America the private property of whites.
28
Of necessity, white supremacy, and its
handmaiden racial purity, require control over women’s bodies. White
heteropatriarchy, however, not only exerts control over women’s bodies for
racial purity, but also for pleasure.
To be clear, like Dred Scott and the entire system of antebellum slavery,
§ 1409 is not averse to what AbrahamLincoln called the “disgust” and “odium”
29
of racial mixing, miscegenation, or the “amalgamation of the races.”
30
After all,
masters, overseers, and other males regularly raped the enslaved, male and
female.
31
Rather, the historical concern of § 1409 is to exclude foreigners from
the polity—the governing body; ownership and inheritance of property—and the
privileges and immunities of citizenship—“white space.”
32
Although any citizen
28. See Harris,WAP, supra note 18, at 1736 (“The right to exclude was the central principle, too, of
whiteness as identity . . . . [t]he possessors of whiteness were granted the legal right to exclude others
from the privileges inhering in whiteness; whiteness became an exclusive club whose membership was
closely and grudgingly guarded.”); see also GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN
WHITENESS: HOW WHITE PEOPLE PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS 1 (2006) (chronicling the United
States’ historical legislation and policies that expressly excluded non-White groups from entitlements);
IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (2006) (documenting the
legal, historical, social, and political forces that create whiteness); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT,
RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 55 (2d ed. 1994) (arguing racial formation refers to “the
sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed.”);
Dana Milbank, Opinion, Yes, Half of Trump Supporters Are Racist, WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/clinton-wasnt-wrong-about-the-deplorables-among-trumps-
supporters/2016/09/12/93720264-7932-11e6-beac-57a4a412e93a_story.html [https://perma.cc/MPN4-
QPJH]; Steve Phillips, Opinion, TrumpWants to Make America White Again, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 15, 2018)
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/15/opinion/trump-wants-to-make-america-white-again.html
[https://perma.cc/ZVL2-GD54] (arguing that the aggressive pace of immigrants of color deportations, the
elimination of the DACA program protecting immigrant children, and the constant dog-whistling cry to
build a wall are all efforts to make America White again).
29. See LINCOLN, supra note 20.
30. See id. at 118.
31. There are no databases and few records of rapes during antebellum slavery. In an early stroke of
legal realism, however, in 1857, then-presidential candidate Abraham Lincoln estimated that white males
had raped enslaved black women at least 405,751 times around the time of 1850 alone. Abraham Lincoln,
Speech on the Dred Scott Decision (June 26, 1857), U. VA., https://www.virginia.edu/woodson/courses/
aas-hius366a/lincoln.html [https://perma.cc/LN4H-9BYN] (“In 1850 there were in the United States,
405,751, mulattoes. Very few of these are the offspring of whites and free blacks; nearly all have sprung
from black slaves and white masters.”). As to the sexual assault of male slaves, Thomas Foster writes,
“The rape of slave men has also gone unacknowledged because of the current and historical tendency to
define rape along gendered lines . . . [which] has obscured our ability to recognize the climate of terror
and the physical and mental sexual abuse that enslaved black men also endured.” Thomas A. Foster, The
Sexual Abuse of Black Men Under American Slavery, 20 J. HIST.OF SEXUALITY 445, 448 (2011). Thomas
argues that there are accounts from both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, including the eighteenth-
century diary of a Jamaican planter Thomas Thistlewood, who tersely noted two incidents of homosexual
assault. In one entry he recorded: “Report of Mr. Watt Committing Sodomy with his Negroe waiting
Boy.” The language is specific enough to indicate this was a case of sodomy. Thistlewood’s diary also
noted “strange reports about the parson and John his man.” While the term “strange reports” is not precise,
Trevor Burnard interprets it as meaning homosexual activity. Id. at 453-54.
32. As Elise Boddie explains, “space itself has social, cultural, and—in particular—racial meaning”
and this “racial meaning helps to instigate territorial behavior in which one racial group seeks to exclude
another racial group from what it perceives to be its own space.” Elise C. Boddie, Racial Territoriality,
58 UCLA L. REV. 401, 435 (2010).
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man, including a man of color, can exclude or confer citizenship on his
nonmarital foreign-born child, the American polity, as an institution, is
synonymous with whiteness. The driving force in the bundle of rights that § 1409
confers upon citizen men is the right to exclude from the American polity, which
structurally assumes whiteness. Section 1409 grants citizen men the right to
transform their nonmarital foreign-born children into trespassers on (white)
American soil. Congress protects citizen men from their nonmarital foreign-born
children who, with the power of citizenship, might roam freely in America, and
perhaps, arrive at the family gathering in the suburbs and ask Dad for inheritance
as well as a serving of turkey.
Section 1409 is “male” in that it confers privileges upon men that it
withholds from women. These are the right to decide whether to transfer
citizenship to offspring, an ability to abandon offspring, and the right to engage
in unprotected sex outside of marriage free from the responsibilities of
parenthood. It would not be hyperbolic to say that § 1409 elevates a class of
johns, purchasers of sex, sexual exploiters, philanders, sexual tourists, and rapists
beyond the reach of parenthood and confers to them a statutorily sanctioned right
to discard their children.
33
It might also not be hyperbolic to say that Congress,
with the Supreme Court’s blessing, is facilitating an international, worldwide
brothel.
Section 1409 is heteropatriarchal in that it facilitates a privilege in men to
perform heterosexually on foreign women free from the sanction of parenthood
and the burden of “illegitimate” inheritors. It paradigmatically exemplifies what
Andrew Krinks calls “the heteropatriarchal familiast ideal,” as it is a law that
organizes life, human embodiment, social structures, and the political economy
according to male desire by subjugating female bodies with a dominant-elite
male gaze
34
for the purposes of phallocentric sexual pleasure and the
perpetuation of male-centered authority and lineage—and describes this all as
the natural order.
Section 1409 ensures female subjugation in two ways: First, § 1409 keeps
foreign women steadfastly prone. Specifically, § 1409 enables citizen men to go
abroad, spread their seed, and then dictate the terms of their relationship with
their children and the mothers of their children or whether to have any
relationship at all. Section 1409 assists citizenmen in leaving the foreignmothers
of their children solely responsible for those children. Section 1409 thwarts any
duty owed by American fathers to their nonmarital foreign-born children or the
33. See Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power:
Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 22
(observing that § 1409 reinforces men’s “sexual irresponsibility” by giving “U.S. men, but not U.S.
women, a choice to disavow the children they conceive with foreign partners”).
34. Using Foucault’s “Panopticon,” the “gaze” creates a sense of “constant and permanent visibility,”
so that the subject self-monitors and thoroughly internalizes the unrelenting surveillance. MICHEL
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 195, 201-02 (1977).
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mothers of their children.
35
Second, § 1409 regulates the sexual activity of citizen
women engaged in nonmarital sex with foreign men through the sanction of
automatic parental responsibility—a kind of reproductive punishment.
36
On the surface, it may seem that § 1409 grants a privilege to citizen women
that it denies citizen men: an opportunity to transfer citizenship automatically.
By contrast, men must undergo a more arduous process.
37
That, however, is
§ 1409’s normative hegemonic trick: disguising treachery as something “good,”
and obfuscating the sexual domination of women as the biological difference
between men and women. Section 1409 camouflages the sexual domination of
women as a bonus for citizen mothers. This deflects attention away from the
hypermasculine sexual performance of men with foreign women and the
sanctioning of women with reproductive punishment for analogous sexual
conduct with foreign men. Structurally, conceptually, and symbolically, § 1409
entertains male sexual prerogative and female domination, subjugation, and
control.
In § 1409, Congress has turned a physiological difference between
establishing paternity and maternity into assumptions, and therefore material
realities, about sexual behavior. These assumptions are inextricably linked to
male power, prerogative, and privilege.Women are not permitted the same range
of sexual prerogative and agency as men under § 1409. Under § 1409, women,
particularly citizen women, should be home raising children, not out “whoring.”
If Congress wanted to avoid the gender asymmetry of § 1409, it could have
granted both citizen men and women prerogative citizenship for their children,
but that would not exact punishment on citizen women who philander with
35. This paper analyzes the application of American law on nonmarital foreign-born children, their
American fathers, and their foreign mothers. This paper does not address the foreign laws applicable to
nonmarital foreign-born children, their American fathers, and their foreign mothers. Section 1409
extinguishes any duty American fathers owe to their nonmarital foreign-born children and the mothers of
those children under American law. I do not argue that American law eliminates the duties foreign
countries impose on these fathers.
36. Saddling women with sole responsibility for children born outside of marriage as a form of
reproductive punishment has a long history around the globe. See, e.g., Mary L. Shanley,Unwed Fathers’
Rights, Adoption, and Sex Equality: Gender-Neutrality and the Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 60, 67 (1995) (explaining that giving custody of nonmarital children to mothers reflects not
“hostility to biological fathers” but the “patriarchal roots of family law,” which produce “devastating
social and economic consequences” for women); Kristin Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are
Mothers’ Duties: The Failure of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE L.J. 1669 (2000)
(arguing that divesting nonmarital fathers of parental rights harms mothers who are exclusively charged
with the care and support of children); Sabina Mariella, Note, Leveling Up Over Plenary Power:
Remedying an Impermissible Gender Classification in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 96 B.U. L.
REV. 219, 227 (2016) (stating that unwed citizen mothers who conceive a child abroad with a noncitizen
bear legal responsibility for their children by the default assignment of their citizenship to their children
at birth; and that the distinction encourages men to conceive children outside of marriage, and compels
women to bear the costs and the stigma of non-marital sex alone when men are unwilling to do so).
Furthermore, saddling women with primary, if not sole responsibility, for nonmarital children is
Congress’s baseline assumption in § 1409, as well as the legal doctrine the Supreme Court ratifies and
normalizes to shield § 1409 from equal protection challenge, as discussed in detail in Part IV.
37. Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1707.
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foreign men.
38
While § 1409 saddles women with the responsibilities of
parenthood, it invests in men a property right to roam freely and abandon their
children. As Justice Ginsburg shrewdly noted in the context of a § 1409 gender-
based equal protection challenge, “There are . . . men out there who are being
Johnny Appleseed.”
39
Section 1409 outsources the white heteropatriarchal work of the state to
individual men—individual citizen fathers—middle managers—as gatekeepers
at the American borders of what Angela Onwuachi-Willig calls “white space”
40
and perpetrators of racialized and gendered violence. It confers a right in men to
police white and nationalistic supremacy’s control over the purity of bloodlines
while simultaneously ensuring access to vulnerable foreign female bodies for
pleasure. Section 1409 outsources the supply of available bodies for sexual
domination beyond the border by liberating men from obligations under
American law for the children who result from their sexual conquest. It thereby
demonstrates the endless adaptability of white heteropatriarchy, particularly its
limitless ability to morph into modern forms of female subjugation abroad
despite the end of antebellum slavery domestically. Section 1409 allows citizen
men to engage in hypermasculinity, as it shuts the door to hapless wards of the
state discarded by their citizen fathers. Far from being an insignificant matter,
§ 1409 impacts the lives of an inestimable number of children abandoned by their
American fathers.
Taken together, § 1409 creates an intersectional hierarchy—a hierarchy that
is raced, classed, sexed, and gendered. Section 1409 grants citizen fathers the
right to exclude their foreign-born children from the polity while facilitating the
vulnerable conditions necessary to continue exploiting foreign women. Property,
like citizenship, allocates resources, but in the context of § 1409, property and
citizenship collude to dominate others and to ratify a hierarchical social order,
38. See Judith Butler, Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and
Feminist Theory, 40 THEATRE J. 519, 527 (1988) (“Gender performances . . . are governed by . . . punitive
and regulatory social conventions.”); Stewart Chang, Feminism in Yellowface, 38 HARV. J. L. & GENDER
235, 262 (2015) (“Gender performance is intertwined with community expectations of how members of
each gender must behave, and when those expectations are not followed, society sanctions and
marginalizes deviant actors.”). Section 1409 envisions and concretizes a world in which women should
be at home raising children, not out “whoring,” or having children with foreign men, and when they do,
§1409 exacts a kind of punishment by saddling women with the responsibilities of parenthood. Compare,
however, § 1409’s vision of men engaged in unprotected sex with foreign women who at their leisure can
escape both the responsibilities of parenthood and responsible sex by being allowed to abandon their
children.
39. Collins, A Short History, supra note 15, at 1495 (“Justice Ginsburg noted wryly, ‘[t]here are ...
men out there who are being Johnny Appleseed,’” and “Justice O’Connor articulated a similar concern,
observing that our sex-based citizenship laws are ‘paradigmatic of a historic regime that left women with
responsibility, and freed men from responsibility, for nonmarital children.’” (quoting Transcript of Oral
Argument at 31, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071))); see Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 92
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
40. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Policing the Boundaries of Whiteness: The Tragedy of Being “Out of
Place” from Emmett Till to Trayvon Martin, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1113, 1119 (2017) (discussing the
development of America as “white space” and the strategies, practices, and tactics for protecting it).
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all under the hegemonic cover of nature.
41
Treating § 1409 as solely a problem
of the biological differences between men and women allows it to surreptitiously
advance its white heteropatriarchal agenda. It is not just race. It is not just class.
It is not just gender. It is all of these things working in concert. Although § 1409
does not explicitly reference race, its explicit silence works an implicit racialized,
as well as gendered, result.
42
Section 1409 is a citizenship regulation that
facilitates a white heteropatriarchal desire to perform hypermasculinity, while
simultaneously functioning as a broader mechanism of population control.
Section 1409 is a classic case of sexually explicit discrimination, masking and
obfuscating
43
racially implicit sexual subjugation, to work a white
heteropatriarchal favorable outcome.
44
Enough cannot be said about § 1409. Section 1409 is perched at the
entangled, intertwined, and mutually reinforcing valences of race, class, gender,
sexuality, war, the American military, rape, sex, sexual tourism, sex trafficking,
hypermasculinity, reproductive domination, racial purity, citizenship, property,
belonging, and statelessness.
45
It is ripe for intersectional analysis. Section 1409
exemplifies how sexism keeps racism in place and racism keeps sexism in place,
with all the spoils awarded to white heteropatriarchy.
46
What is at stake in equal
protection challenges to § 1409 is not only its constitutionality, but also white
heteropatriarchy’s entrenched legacy of creating and sustaining hierarchy,
vulnerability, and regimes of violence and exploitation.
Part I of this Article lays out the text of § 1409. Drawing on the extensive
work of Kristin Collins, Part II historically contextualizes § 1409 to reveal its
mens rea. Historical contextuality de-obfuscates § 1409’s coercive nature and
underlying legal legacy.
47
Part II grounds § 1409’s genesis in the legacy of
antebellum slavery to expose how the absence of citizenship in enslaved females
in combination with the rule of matrilineal succession worked to facilitate the
WHP—a white heteropatriarchal property right in philandering, sexual
exploitation, and rape, prototypically exemplified in Dred Scott.
41. See Joseph William Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKEL.J. 1287, 1299 (2014).
42. See Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2134 (“[A]n important yet overlooked reason
for the development of gender- and marriage-based derivative citizenship law—jus sanguinis
citizenship—was officials’ felt need to enforce the racially nativist policies that were a core component
of American nationality law for over 150 years.”).
43. See FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 10, at 86 (“[P]ower is tolerable only
on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own
mechanisms.”).
44. As Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term intersectionality, § 1409 is quintessentially “the
imposition of one burden that interacts with preexisting vulnerabilities to create yet another dimension of
disempowerment.” Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV 1241, 1249 (1991).
45. See generally SUSAN ZEIGER, ENTANGLINGALLIANCES: FOREIGNWARBRIDES ANDAMERICAN
SOLDIERS IN THE TWENTIETHCENTURY 9 (Kindle ed., 2010).
46. Crenshaw,Mapping the Margins, supra note 44, at 1249.
47. Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1673.
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Drawing on the work of Cheryl Harris and modern theories of property, Part
III proposes a theoretical foundation for the WHP as a conceptual model. As a
conceptual model, theWHP problematizes § 1409’s function, brings it into sharp
relief, and exposes it to the precious antiseptic light of day. Historical
contextuality and property as a theoretical framework expose the choices and
values underlying § 1409, particularly the value of male access to the bodies of
foreign women outweighing the value of discarded and abandoned foreign life.
Using the historical context of § 1409, as well as the property rubric of theWHP,
Part IV analyzes the Supreme Court cases that have sustained the constitutional









Part IV centralizes whiteness, hypermasculinity,
and hypersexualized foreign women as the central tenets, governing principles,
and driving forces upon which the Supreme Court has clung in defending the
property interests embedded in § 1409. Whiteness, hypermasculinity, and
hypersexualized foreign women are part of the intellectual machinery and
Supreme Court narratives that justify the nefarious operations of § 1409. Part IV
demonstrates how § 1409 is part of an intended and organized regime of
racialized sexual domination, all ratified in law. As argued in more detail in Part
IV, in the last of the four cases, Morales-Santana, Justice Ginsburg, writing for
the majority, launched a Herculean effort to find an equal protection violation in
§ 1409. More specifically, she found that the more lenient physical presence
requirement that applied to female citizens, not males, violated equal protection.
In fashioning a remedy, however, the Court preserved male privilege at the
expense of women, applying the more onerous standard to both men and women,
as opposed to nullifying the more onerous standard entirely. Part V proposes
solutions, including automatic citizenship for nonmarital foreign-born children
of both citizen men and women.
I. WHAT IS TITLE 8, UNITED STATES CODE, § 1409?
The United States has “two sources of citizenship, and two only—birth and
naturalization.”
52
As to “birth” citizenship, the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees that every person “born in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no
naturalization.”
53
As to naturalization, congressional acts govern the acquisition
of citizenship by persons not born in the United States.
54
48. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
49. 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
50. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
51. 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
52. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702 (1898).
53. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
54. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 703.
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There are two sources of birthright citizenship: (1) place of birth (jus soli)
or (2) parentage (jus sanguinis).
55
This Article addresses the latter, jus sanguinis
citizenship—a right to citizenship by virtue of a circumstance or condition in
existence at the time of a child’s birth.
56
More specifically, this Article focuses
on a form of jus sanguinis citizenship applicable to American citizens, male and
female, who have children out of wedlock and in foreign places, a set of laws
known as citizenship transmission laws or derivative citizenship laws, codified
in Title 8, United States Code, §§ 1401 and 1409.
57
When citizenship derives from parentage (jus sanguinis), American
citizenship laws explicitly discriminate on the basis of marital status as well as
the gender of the parents in the transmission of citizenship to foreign-born
children.
58
Title 8, United States Code, § 1401(g) governs citizenship
transmission to children born outside of the United States and its outlying
possessions to married parents when one is a citizen and the other is an alien.
59
Section 1401 provides that the child is also a citizen if, before the birth, the
citizen parent had been physically present in the United States for a total of five
years, at least two of which were after the parent turned fourteen years of age.
60
As for children born under the same circumstances, but to unmarried
parents, § 1409(a) sets forth the following requirements when the father is the
citizen parent and the mother is an alien:
(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is established
by clear and convincing evidence,
(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time of the
person’s birth,
(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide
financial support for the person until the person reaches the age of 18
years, and
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years—
(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person’s residence
or domicile,
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under
oath, or
55. The Fourteenth Amendment confers jus soli citizenship based on place of birth. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. Acts of Congress, however, govern the grant of citizenship to persons born outside of
the United States. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 702-03 (explaining that persons born outside of the
United States only acquire citizenship by birth pursuant to acts of Congress).
56. Collins, A Short History, supra note 15, at 1487.
57. Id.
58. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c)-(e), (g)-(h) (2019), with 8 U.S.C. § 1409.
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g).
60. Id. As will be discussed in more detail in Part IV, the last § 1409 challenge to reach the Supreme
Court, Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 (2017), nullified an earlier version of this
physical presence requirement.
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(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a
competent court.
61
In addition, § 1409(a) incorporates the physical presence requirement of §
1401(g).
In stark contrast, when a citizen woman gives birth to a nonmarital foreign
born child fathered by a foreign man, the requirements for the transmittal of
citizenship are described in § 1409(c):
(c) Notwithstanding the provision of subsection (a) of this section, a
person born, after December 23, 1952, outside the United States and out
of wedlock shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status
of his mother, if the mother had the nationality of the United States at
the time of such person’s birth, and if the mother had previously been
physically present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions
for a continuous period of one year.
62
Section 1409 thus imposes a set of requirements on citizen fathers that it
does not impose on citizen mothers, namely proof of paternity by clear and
convincing evidence, a written agreement by the father to pay child support, and
paternal acknowledgment of the child before the child’s eighteenth birthday.
63
Before turning to the historical context out of which § 1409 emerged, it is
imperative to highlight several distinguishing features of § 1409—features that
explain the power § 1409 confers to men.
64
Sections 1409(a)(3) and (4) set a
statute of limitations (eighteen years) for citizenship claims brought by or on
behalf of nonmarital foreign-born children of citizen fathers; nonmarital foreign-
born children of citizen mothers have no such limitations.
65
Section 1409(a)(3)’s
requirement of financial support in writing and § 1409(a)(4)’s requirement of
legitimation (a father’s declaration of paternity under oath or a court order of
paternity) confer control to men.
66
Section 1409(a)(1) requires the “blood”
relationship between the child and father,
67
but that relationship requirement may
61. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c).
63. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
64. See id.; Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2235.
65. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c).
66. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
67. See Manisha Lalwani, The “Intelligent Wickedness” of U.S. Immigration Law Conferring
Citizenship to Children Born Abroad and Out-of-Wedlock: A Feminist Perspective, 47 VILL. L. REV. 707,
735 (2002) (demonstrating that the legislative history reveals that the superfluousness of the legitimation
requirements in 1409(a)(4), when 1409(a)(1) already requires a biological relationship, originated from
an adoption of the coverture principles into § 1409(a)(4), with the three legitimation options merely
simplifying the previously complex legitimation rules); Lica Tomizuka, The Supreme Court’s Blind
Pursuit of Outdated Definitions of Familial Relationships in Upholding the Constitutionality of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409 in Nguyen v. INS, 20 LAW& INEQ. 275, 306 (2002).
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be satisfied against the father’s will or without the father’s consent.
68
By contrast,
§§ 1409(a)(3) and (4) pivot around male prerogative. This prerogative is
absolutely central to an analysis of § 1409. Unlike women, who transfer
citizenship automatically, § 1409 gives men the power to exclude their
nonmarital foreign-born children from citizenship. In doing so, it allows men to
engage in unprotected hypermasculinity while abroad with foreign women,
liberated from the responsibilities of parenthood.
As discussed in more detail in Part IV, § 1409 is particularly pernicious
because the Supreme Court has tucked the power § 1409 confers to men behind
the “natural” differences between men and women in establishing genetic
parentage. It is this obfuscating function that Justices Stevens and Kennedy, both
American servicemen ostensibly intimately familiar with the sexual practices
and ethics of the military, deployed in shielding § 1409 from equal protection
challenges. In the doctrine that shields § 1409 from challenge, the “natural”
difference between men and women is used to obfuscate the hegemonic function
of § 1409. In this way, § 1409 gives the owner of citizenship an entitlement to
foreign women’s bodies that becomes naturalized in the everyday.
As developed in more detail in Part II, § 1409 did not evolve out of nature
and the biological difference between men and women. As Kristin Collins has
argued, § 1409 is a product of choices, particularly choices about values and the
relationship between rights and power.
69
White heteropatriarchy prefers to
truncate history because it appears more innocent in freeze-frame analysis, which
is fundamental to its obfuscating survival, deniability, and claims of sweet
innocence. Section 1409 is the product of centuries of individual decisionmakers,
lawmakers, judges, administrators, and other legal actors with vested interests
that are raced, classed, sexed, and gendered.
70
Section 1409 bestows a right on
men who father nonmarital children abroad to abandon those children. It enables
citizen fathers to control the terms of the legal relationship with their children as
well as with the mothers of their children. It also empowers citizen men to
determine whether to have a relationship at all.
71
The power Congress confers to
citizen men is absolutely central to both an understanding and critique of § 1409.
The intersectionality of marital status and gender-differentiated norms for the
transference of citizenship—the distinction between automatic parenthood for
women and prerogative parenthood for men—is part of an enduring legacy that
(1) grants men the right to engage in unprotected sexual conduct outside of
68. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 67 (2001) (remarking on how paternity can be established
against the father’s will or knowledge if DNA samples from a few strands of hair are collected years after
the birth).
69. Singer, supra note 41, at 1323; Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2137.
70. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2134, 2144 (contextualizing § 1409 historically as
a product of lawmakers, judges, and administrators who made choices based on “racially nativist nation-
building project” and “norms and mores concerning gender, parental roles, [and] sexuality”).
71. Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1698.
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marriage with foreign women without incurring the full weight of parenthood;
(2) sanctions women with parenthood for engaging in sex outside of marriage;
(3) protects men from the children they abandon; and (4) protects the polity from
children men have abandoned, all strapped in § 1409.
II. § 1409’S CONTEXTUALITYREVEALS ITSMENS REA
As Justice Ginsburg noted, “History reveals what lurks behind” the
derivative citizenship statute.
72
What lurks behind § 1409 is a long legacy of
white heteropatriarchy deploying the legal mechanism of citizenship to create
property rights in others, more pointedly to perfect sovereignty in itself and
vulnerability in others. Both the historical context of § 1409 and the conceptual
model proposed in Part III—the WHP—serve the same function: to expose the
nefarious underbelly of § 1409 and to subject it to precious antiseptic light.
Section 1409 is a direct descendant of antebellum slavery, where the trifecta of
propertizing vulnerable bodies, barring citizenship, and following matrilineal
succession outside of marriage
73
made the enslaved a perennial source of
unbridled cheap sex while simultaneously eliminating “illegitimate” inheritors
from individual lines of inheritance or belonging in the American polity.
Grounding § 1409 squarely within its racist, sexist, and hypermasculine past
eliminates any claims or justifications involving nature, innocence, or un-
intendedness. Instead, both historical contextuality and the WHP cast § 1409 as
a deliberate societal policy created by intentional individual decisions, all vested
with interests in whiteness, hypermasculinity, and hypersexualized and
racialized female bodies upon which to perform sexual violence. It is historical
context that gives § 1409 content.
The history of § 1409 exposes the choices and vested interests of American
imperialism, policymakers, judges, administrators, servicemen, and sexual
tourists in a legal regime that enshrines, ratifies, and protects hypermasculine
performances on the bodies of foreign women liberated from paternity and
citizenship claims from their offspring. Nature and neutrality did not create
§ 1409 or the normative base that interprets and safeguards it. White
heteropatriarchy did. The history of § 1409 epitomizes the law’s active role in
72. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2017); see also Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 78
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that sex-based statutes, like §1409, cannot be viewed in a vacuum; but
rather, their gender based disparity becomes clearer when historicized and placed in historical context,
stating, “Sex based statutes, even when accurately reflecting the way most men or women behave, deny
individuals opportunity. Such generalizations must be viewed not in isolation, but in the context of our
Nation’s “ ‘long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.’”) (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,
511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994)); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 460-61 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(revealing the hegemonic trick of § 1409, which masquerades as something favorable toward women, but
when placed in historical context reveals that it privileges ideas about women being primary caregivers
stating, “But pages of history place the provision in real-world perspective.”).
73. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2152.
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creating and sustaining racialized and gendered hierarchies in the American
polity.
74
Far from innocent, its history reveals its hegemonic function in
normalizing the denigration of women and the abandonment of “illegitimate”
children. In addition to cloaking its function with nature, § 1409 achieves its
hegemonic operation by assuming a baseline that seamlessly incorporates the
vested interests of the WHP as political ideology, legal doctrine, and
philosophical assumptions while peddling these vested interests as biological,
natural, and “just the way things are.”
75
Furthermore, the history of § 1409 reverses the pathological gaze: rather
than fixating on hypersexualized foreign women, who Justice Kennedy
disturbingly said “may be unsure of the father’s identity,”
76
or the evil specter of
millions of war babies raiding the government coffers and flooding American
bureaucracies with fraudulent claims of inheritance and citizenship, historical
context focuses attention on a class of johns, purchasers of sex, sexual exploiters,
philanders, and rapists, as well as the judges, lawmakers, and administrators that
are complicit in their scheme. Moreover, reversing the pathological gaze through
historicizing lays the foundation to bring § 1409 in line with modern notions of
democracy and fairness.
As part of this historical contextualization, Section II.A squarely grounds
§ 1409 in its roots, antebellum chattel slavery. Drawing on Kristin Collins’s
extensive work on § 1409, Section II.B discusses Guyer v. Smith
77
as part of the
lineage of § 1409 and as an example of white heteropatriarchy’s adaptability
after Dred Scott appeared imperiled. Section II.C traces three governing forces
in the historical development of American citizenship and immigration law: (1)
whiteness, (2) hypermasculinity, and (3) female subordination. These governing
principles comprise the central tenets of the WHP as well as of immigration law
generally. As will be discussed in Part IV, these central tenets will become the
three prongs that the Supreme Court uses to immunize § 1409 from equal
protection challenges. Finally, as Collins has argued, Section II.D explicates how
Congress and the military actively discouraged interracial marriage between
American men and racialized foreign women, while simultaneously facilitating
sex trafficking between them, all of which led to disproportionate numbers of
racialized children being discarded by their American fathers. Part II, overall,
provides the historical tissue connecting § 1409’s deliberate restrictions on
citizenship claims asserted by or on behalf of the nonmarital foreign-born
children of American fathers to what Collins calls “a troubling practice of sexual
exploitation of non-white foreign women by white American men.”
78
74. Id. at 2139-40.
75. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1352 (1988).
76. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 54.
77. 22 Md. 239 (1864) (foreign-born children who remain illegitimate do not qualify for citizenship).
78. Collins, A Short History, supra note 15, at 1492.
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A. Dred Scott and the Anatomy of the WHP
Vulnerability is the lynchpin of exploitation.
79
Antebellum chattel slavery
exemplifies this point. Without the full protections of citizenship, African
Americans had no access to the courts or police and were, therefore, prone to





Virginia colonial assembly ruled that “[c]hildren got by an Englishman upon a
Negro woman shall be bond or free according to the condition of the mother.”
82
In reversing the traditional common law presumption that the father determined
the status of the child, the rule of matrilineage for the enslaved in combination
with the negation of citizenship concretized the continued vulnerability of
enslaved women to rape, philandering, and sexual exploitation. As Cheryl Harris
noted, it also facilitated the reproduction of a white heteropatriarchal-dominated
labor force.
83
As founding father Thomas Jefferson bragged, the profitability of
enslaved black women could be realized more efficiently from breeding than
from labor, stating, “I consider the labor of a breeding woman as no object, and
that a child raised every 2 years is of more profit than the crop of the best laboring
man.”
84
In remarking on the economic incentives for owners to rape their
enslaved, abolitionist Henry Highland Garnet concluded that the true treachery
of slavery arose from the enslaver’s desire to possess the sexuality of the slave,
79. Cook, Stop Traffic, supra note 8 (manuscript at 3).
80. In her autobiography about slavery, Harriet Jacobs described the complete control her master
exerted over her: “[H]e was my master. I was compelled to live under the same roof with him . . . . He
told me I was his property; that I must be subject to his will in all things.” HARRIET JACOBS, INCIDENTS
IN THE LIFE OF A SLAVE GIRL, CLASSIC AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN’S NARRATIVES 223 (William L.
Andrews ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2003) (1861). In describing Jacobs’s narrative, Henry Louis Gates, Jr.,
stated it “charts in vivid detail precisely how the shape of her life and the choices she makes are defined
by her reduction to a sexual object, an object to be raped, bred or abused.” Gates, To be Raped, Bred or
Abused, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Nov. 22, 1987, at 12; see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug
Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419,
1437 (1991) (describing acts of unbridled power stating, “Slaveowners forced women to lie face down in
a depression in the ground while they were whipped. This procedure allowed the masters to protect the
fetus while abusing the mother.”).
81. Many historians of Africans in the United States begin with the arrival, in 1619, of a ship in
Jamestown carrying twenty black persons, likely slaves, although possibly indentured servants. See A.
LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR 20-21 (Oxford Univ. Press 1979) (1978). It is
interesting to note that the Virginia colonial assembly set rules on matrilineal succession less than fifty
years after the arrival of that ship.
82. Harris, WAP, supra note 18 at 1719 (citing HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 81, at 43). By the late
1600s and early 1700s, the legislatures of various colonies adopted similar rules of classification. See,
e.g., HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 81, at 128, 252 (citing a 1706 New York statute; and then citing a 1755
Georgia law).
83. Harris, WAP, supra note 18 at 1719 n.37 (“According to Paula Giddings, the Virginia statute
completed ‘[t]he circle of denigration . . . [in] combin[ing] racism, sexism, greed, and piety” in that it
“laid women open to the most vicious exploitation.’ She noted that ‘a master could save the cost of buying
new slaves by impregnating his own slave, or for that matter having anyone impregnate her.’” (quoting
PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN
AMERICA 37 (1984))).
84. Harris, WAP, supra note 18 at 1720 n.38 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Jordan
(Dec. 21, 1805)).
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writing, “Every man who resides on his plantation may have his harem, and has
every inducement of custom, and of pecuniary gain, to tempt him to the common
practice.”
85
As Kimberlé Crenshaw has noted, for the enslaved woman, “[t]heir
femaleness made them sexually vulnerable to racist domination, while their
Blackness effectively denied them any protection.”
86
This dichotomy is central
to an understanding of § 1409’s function. The negation of citizenship in both
child and mother coupled with matrilineage outside marriage aided white men in
raping enslaved women, protected white men from the duties and responsibilities
of fathering children, and protected the racial purity of white sovereignty, the
governing principles underlying § 1409.
These intersectional governing principles that privilege white
heteropatriarchy
87
lie at the heart of Dred Scott, a Supreme Court decision that
further entrenched antebellum planation slavery and the legal domination of
black people. Dred Scott accomplished much: (1) it affirmed the continued the
use of the “Negro” as property
88
; (2) it held that anyone of African descent was
not a citizen, including free blacks
89
; and (3) it affirmed that the status of the
enslaved child followed that of the mother (matrilineage outside marriage).
85. 2 HARRIET MARTINEAU, SOCIETY IN AMERICA 320 (AMS Press, Inc. 1966) (1837) (footnote
omitted). In an early stroke of legal realism, Lincoln remarked on the scale of white males raping enslaved
females in the mid-nineteenth century and argued that slavery incentivized the amalgamation of the races
though rape, rather than racial purity:
In 1850 there were in the United States, 405,751, mulattoes. Very few of these are the offspring of
whites and free blacks; nearly all have sprung from black slaves and white masters. A separation of
the races is the only perfect preventive of amalgamation but as all immediate separation is
impossible the next best thing is to keep them apart where they are not already together. If white and
black people never get together in Kansas, they will never mix blood in Kansas. That is at least one
self-evident truth. A few free colored persons may get into the free States, in any event; but their
number is too insignificant to amount to much in the way of mixing blood. In 1850 there were in the
free states, 56,649 mulattoes; but for the most part they were not born there—they came from the
slave States, ready made up. In the same year the slave States had 348,874 mulattoes all of home
production. The proportion of free mulattoes to free blacks—the only colored classes in the free
states—is much greater in the slave than in the free states. It is worthy of note too, that among the
free states those which make the colored man the nearest to equal the white, have, proportionally
the fewest mulattoes the least of amalgamation. In New Hampshire, the State which goes farthest
towards equality between the races, there are just 184 Mulattoes while there are in Virginia—how
many do you think? 79,775, being 23,126 more than in all the free States together.
Lincoln, supra note 31.
86. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
139, 158-59 (1989).
87. In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney, writing for the majority, famously declared that people in
America of African descent had “no rights which white man was bound to respect” whether born free, set
free, or enslaved. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Chief Justice Taney explained that the Constitution did not confer
citizenship to African Americans. They were “not included, and were not intended to be included, under
the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution” and “therefore [they can] claim none of the rights and privileges”
of citizenship.Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404; see ErnestoHernández-López, GlobalMigrations and Imagined
Citizenship: Examples from Slavery, Chinese Exclusion, and When Questioning Birthright Citizenship,
14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 255, 265-266 (2008).
88. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 410.
89. Id. at 395.
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Taken together, these policies ensured the continued vulnerability of the
enslaved to sexual exploitation.
90
Dred Scott exemplifies how the denial of
citizenship concretized the use of African Americans as property and left African
Americans in a form of statelessness, leaving them vulnerable and defenseless
targets for sexual terrorism. In Dred Scott, the denial of citizenship to anyone of
African descent left them without recourse to the courts or to legal protection,
and therefore vulnerable to unbridled performances of rape, power, and rituals
of spectacle.
91
Without citizenship and personhood, one cannot assert an interest
in or against property. The combined effect of propertization, lack of citizenship,
and the rule of matrilineage allowed white males to continue unprotected and
unbridled feats of hypermasculinity on the bodies of enslaved women without
incurring illegitimate inheritors and while maintaining racial purity in the
polity.
92
Like Dred Scott, § 1409 demonstrates how property and citizenship occupy
central roles in the allocation, preservation, and maintenance of sovereignty and
vulnerability. As in antebellum slavery, § 1409 illustrates how property laws,
and the policies they animate, have long channeled the benefits of full citizenship
through one’s relationship to property. Dred Scott solidified a property right in
philandering, rape, and sexual exploitation, as well as a right of sovereignty in
the owner and vulnerability in the victim. In antebellum slavery and § 1409,
white heteropatriarchal sexual autonomy is achieved through the foreign
woman’s sexual subjugation (the propertization of her sexual function).
93
Similarly, white heteropatriarchal reproductive freedom is achieved through the
denial of reproductive freedom for the enslaved and the disenfranchisement of
the enslaved female and her child. Additionally, the denial of citizenship to the
enslaved enshrined the antebellum enslavers’ economic investment in the
enslaved’s sexual function.
94
The enslavers’ economic investment in the
90. Id.
91. Id. at 406. See also Mitchell F. Crusto, Blackness as Property: Sex, Race, Status, and Wealth, 1
STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & C.L. 51, 52, 75 (2005) (arguing that the paradigms of private property, enslavement,
and sexuality shared a nexus of white males generating wealth and sexual gratification through cheap
land, the exploitation of enslaved labor, and the exploitation of black female labor and sexuality; and that
these paradigms interacted to create the white male “American Dream” of cheap land, cheap labor, and
cheap sex).
92. To be clear, Dred Scott was only one among many cross-pollinated and cyclically reinforcing
factors that ensured the racial domination of African Americans.
93. Crusto, supra note 91, at 81 (“[W]hite masters exploited enslaved black women to satisfy their
desire for cheap sex.”); see also Cheryl I. Harris, Finding Sojourner’s Truth: Race, Gender, and the
Institution of Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 309, 334 (1996) (“[W]hile sexual contact between Black
men and white women was rigorously policed, the sexual abuse and rape of Black women was
decriminalized. This allowed for the full sexual exploitation of Black women’s bodies and
systematic sexual abuse without social consequences or legal sanction.” (footnote omitted) (citing
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?: Feminist and Antiracist Appropriations of
Anita Hill, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER 402, 413 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992))).
94. Neal Kumar Katyal, Men Who Own Women: A Thirteenth Amendment Critique of Forced
Prostitution, 103 YALE L.J. 791, 792 (1993) (“Both pimps and antebellum slave masters have and had
economic investments in women’s sexual functions.”).
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enslaved’s sexually subjugated function was so important to the nation that it
rose to the occasion of constitutional protection. As the Chief Justice Roger
Taney famously declared, people in America of African descent had “no rights
which white man was bound to respect” whether born free, set free, or
enslaved.
95
Taney explained that the Constitution did not confer citizenship to
African Americans.
96
They were “not included, and were not intended to be
included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution” and “therefore [they can]
claim none of the rights and privileges” of citizenship.
97
For blacks, this
constitutional relationship ensured complete subjugation for the very purpose of
unbridled exploitation.
98
In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney grapples with the question, “What must
white supremacy do to own the sexual function of the enslaved?” In answering
this question, Chief Justice Taney understands a vital element of § 1409. The
continued use and enjoyment of the enslaved’s sexual function requires
controlling the status of the offspring. In other words, the white father’s right to
discard his child, abandoning fatherly responsibility as a matter of law, is the
sine qua non of owning the enslaved mother’s sexual function. Eliminating
fatherly responsibility licensed white males to continue the naked propertization
of the enslaved’s sexual function for hypermasculine performance. Like § 1409,
Chief Justice Taney achieves the “absenting of fatherly responsibility” by
endorsing the rule of matrilineage for the enslaved. Harkening all the way back
to the Roman Empire and the Institutes of Justinian, Chief Justice Taney made it
abundantly clear that, as in § 1409, the enslaved followed the status of the
mother, noting that in the Roman Empire, slave status “was decided by the
condition of the mother,” and quoting the Institutes of Justinian to show that
slaves had long been “born such of bondwomen.”
99
Like § 1409, Chief Justice
Taney and the Dred Scott Supreme Court understood that the continued sexual
domination of the mother mandated the right to legally discard the child.
95. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. at 407.
96. Id. at 404.
97. Id.
98. Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution allowed southern states to count slaves as three-
fifths persons for the purposes of apportionment in Congress (even though the slaves could not, of course,
vote). JUAN F. PEREA ET.AL., RACEANDRACES 104 (3d ed. 2015). Article I, Section 9, Clause 1 restrained
Congress’s ability to stop the slave trade by expressly denying congressional power to prohibit
importation of new slaves until 1808. PEREA, supra. Furthermore, Article IV, Section 2, Clause 3
mandated that slaves who escaped into freedom in the North were required to be sent back to their owners
in the South. PEREA, supra. Article IV, Section 2, Clause 3, contains the Fugitive Slave Clause, which
states:
No person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall,
in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall
be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.
PEREA, supra. In effect, these constitutional provisions, by ensuring slavery and rendering non-free
persons property, legally prohibited Blacks from being citizens and asserting fundamental rights. Id. Each
of these clauses of the Constitution made black bodies vulnerable to exploitation by operation of law.
99. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 478-79; see Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2151.
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Lest there be any doubt about white heteropatriarchy’s use of citizenship to
create vulnerability for the express purpose of sexual exploitation, in 1867, then-
presidential candidate Abraham Lincoln drew the connection between
citizenship, property, and sexual domination in the following response to the
Dred Scott decision:
This very Dred Scott case affords a strong test as to which party most
favors amalgamation [of the races], the Republicans or the dear union-
saving Democracy. Dred Scott, his wife and two daughters were all
involved in the suit. We desired the [C]ourt to have held that they were
citizens so far at least as to entitle them to a hearing as to whether they
were free or not; and then, also, that they were in fact and in law really
free. Could we have had our way, the chances of these black girls, ever
mixing their blood with that of white people, would have been
diminished at least to the extent that it could not have been without their
consent. But Judge Douglas is delighted to have them decided to be
slaves, and not human enough to have a hearing, even if they were free,
and thus left subject to the forced concubinage of their masters, and
liable to become the mothers of mulattoes in spite of themselves—the
very state of case that produces nine tenths of all the mulattoes—all the
mixing of blood in the nation.
100
In grounding the utter savagery that was antebellum slavery in the original
intent of the Founding Fathers, Chief Justice Taney made the following
statement, which bears repeating in its entirety because his narrative provides
foundational grounding for the WHP and recurring themes in the legal doctrines
surrounding § 1409:
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an
inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race,
either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro
might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was
bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and
traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it. This opinion was at that
time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race. It was
regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics, which no one
thought of disputing, or supposed to be open to dispute; and men in
every grade and position in society daily and habitually acted upon it in
their private pursuits, as well as in matters of public concern, without
doubting for a moment the correctness of this opinion.
101
100. Lincoln, supra note 31.
101. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407.
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Several distinguishing features of Chief Justice Taney’s straightforward,
transparent, undiluted, de-obfuscated, and fully intended white supremacist
mantra should be noted, as they are ongoing themes in the genealogy and
doctrine of § 1409. In order to appreciate the function of § 1409, one might
substitute foreign women and their nonmarital children fathered by American
men in the quote above for the contemplated “negro” or enslaved. The idea of
inferiority as a justification for the domination and propertization of human
beings has an extensive history in Western thought. It is just this notion of
“inferiority” that will figure prominently in the legal doctrine surrounding § 1409
as it relates to the exclusion of foreigners and both the hypersexualization and
sexual domination of foreign women (“treated as an ordinary article of
merchandise and traffic”
102
), developed in more detail in Parts III and IV.
Chief Justice Taney’s mantra reflects the deliberate creation of a form of
statelessness (“no rights which the white man was bound to respect”
103
) for the
express purpose of propertization, commodification, and sexual trade.
Section 1409 facilitates a wall of immunity around citizen men while abroad as
they procreate and sexually exploit foreign women, leaving both their offspring
and foreign women in a figurative and literal form of statelessness. It is the very
exclusion of anyone of African descent—foreign women and their children—
from the legal category of citizenship that facilitates their vulnerability to
dominant desire and fetish.
In drawing the distinction between both the “private pursuits and public
world,” Chief Justice Taney dog-whistles a veiled appeal to an ongoing theme in
§ 1409, the distinction between the sexual politics and cultural norms of the slave
quarters versus that of the big house, the master’s house.
104
Under § 1409, as in
antebellum slavery, citizen men can activate the sexual politics and cultural
norms of the slave shacks and preserve their respectability politics at home in the
“big house.” Section 1409 outsources the supply of enslaved females to the
platforms of hypersexualized foreign women for hypermasculine sexual
performance. Section 1409 provides the “dark place,” where citizen men can let
their sexual energy explode unbridled and come unhinged. It allows citizen men
the opportunity to keep their impulses in check under cover of respectability
politics while at home, and then let their impulses go unchecked abroad. It
liberates citizen men from the expectation of respectability at home, so that they
can go abroad liberated from those cultural restraints and come unhinged in the
slave shacks. It allows citizen men to present fine-tuned, highly moral, dignified
images in the American public, and then let their unrestrained impulses explode
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ever happened.
105
Section 1409 restrains the foreign-born nonmarital child’s
ability to push against the private/public boundary between male prerogative in
the shack and respectability in the big house. Allowing the foreign-born
nonmarital child, particularly those who are racialized, the free-flowing freedom
to show up at Dad’s home, his house of worship, and in his community would
pierce the veneer of respectability and would subject Dad to tremendous
questioning about what exactly happened down in the shack. Congress has
restrained the foreign-born nonmarital child from pushing across the partition of
private slave shack politics and publicly damaging respectability in the big house
of the American polity. Furthermore, § 1409 allows for the illusion that the
Japanese comfort women and rapes in the Congo are “foreign” phenomena by
those “evil” people, rather than the routinized practices of a highly industrial
nation, right here at home.
Unlike the individualized actions of citizen men, § 1409 makes sexual
domination systemic. Citizen men are not making decisions as atomized
individual agents or singular secretaries of state, but rather, from a long enduring
culture of white heteropatriarchal supremacy. Congress has created a power
imbalance between foreign women and citizen men, which also functions as part
of the sexually exploitative draw and allure for citizen men toward foreign
women. It is where vulnerability becomes enticing. The grant or denial of
citizenship acts as a white heteropatriarchal cudgel—a whip—in the already
highly imbalanced power relationship between citizen men, who are coming
from a rich country, and foreign women, who often are not. Facilitating the
domination of foreign women, therefore, is part of the property right that
Congress bestows on citizen men. The ability to dictate the terms of the
relationship with foreign women and their offspring as well as to determine
whether there will be a relationship at all becomes dialectical in that it reinforces
the vulnerability while simultaneously serving as enticing.
Before turning to the theoretical framework for the WHP, one more
comparison between § 1409 and antebellum slavery may be illustrative. Dorothy
Roberts explains that a common method of whipping the pregnant enslaved
female throughout the South illustrates the slave owners’ dual interest in owning
the enslaved woman, particularly her sexual function, and maximizing her use
as a reproductive harvester: “Slaveowners forced [pregnant] women to lie face
down in a depression in the ground while they were whipped. This procedure
allowed the masters to protect the commercial fetus while abusing the
mother.”
106
Both § 1409 and the whipping of the pregnant enslaved vividly
105. Anthony Farley, The Black Body as Fetish Object, 76 OR. L. REV. 457, 464 (1997) (“Race is a
form of pleasure in one’s body which is achieved through humiliation of the Other and, then, as the last
step, through a denial of the entire process . . . . By denying their fetishization of ‘race,’ whites create a
culture in which they are both masters and innocents.”).
106. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 80, at 1438.
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illustrate that control over the child was inextricably intertwined with the
continued domination of the mother. In antebellum slavery, the slave owner was
incentivized to protect the child’s life for commercial gain, while still exerting
complete domination over the enslaved mother. In § 1409, the right to eliminate
the child from personhood, as a practical matter, is endemic to the continued
sexual enjoyment of foreign women. Controlling the child is fundamentally
important to dominating the mother. Whether the gain or loss is protected, the
goal is the domination of the female body, which necessitates control over the
offspring.
In order to understand the intersectional interconnectedness and mutually
reinforcing layers of race, class, gender, property, and citizenship in § 1409, it is
imperative to acknowledge how slavery created a culture that incentivized and
normalized sexual terrorism. The history of rape during antebellum chattel
slavery provides the quintessential backdrop for understanding the moves and
maneuvering in § 1409: by denying citizenship to both enslaved and their
offspring coupled with matrilineage outside marriage, slaveholders were able to
perpetuate a property interest in rape, sexual exploitation, and philandering, the
prototype for § 1409. Moreover, non-inheritance erased any claim of legacy
between an enslaved child and white father—for the children of Thomas
Jefferson and Sally Hemmings, for example—while effectively ensuring that the
legal heirs of white ruling-class men remained white, all embedded in § 1409.
107
B. Guyer: Extending the WHP
Although the Fourteenth Amendment effectively overruled Dred Scott, it
remains foundational for using citizenship to create a white heteropatriarchal
property right in sexual domination. As Cheryl Harris helps us to understand,
after legalized forms of white supremacy, like slavery or segregation, were
overturned, the white heteropatriarchal property right in hypermasculinity
evolved into a more modern form through the law’s ratification of the settled
expectations of white heteropatriarchal privilege as a legitimate and natural
baseline.
108
Section 1409 demonstrates the unrelenting adaptability of white
heteropatriarchy: It achieves the propertization of foreign human bodies without
announcing itself as such. It is an example of how even after slavery was
outlawed, the same result can be achieved by other means. Guyer v. Smith,
109
decided in 1864, also illustrates this point.
107. E. Michelle Rabouin, “Gifting Children of Promise”: Re-Imagining the Academic Margins as
Transformative Legal Space, 3 J. GENDER RACE& JUST. 581 (2000).
108. Harris,WAP, supra note 18 at 1741.
109. 22 Md. 239 (1864).
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As the advancement of abolition undermined the legal substructure of
slavery and when Dred Scott was no longer sound precedent,
110
Guyer
maintained a stronghold over a white heteropatriarchal power to sexually exploit
foreign women, to be free of the inheritance claims of their offspring, and to
protect the polity from racialized others. According to Kristin Collins, the Guyer
court incorporated into citizenship law “the same set of domestic relations law
principles that had been instrumental to the maintenance of slavery and the denial
of citizenship for persons of African descent: laws that recognized the unmarried
mother as the source of status for her children, including slave status.”
111
Guyer
recognized the ability to preserve a hierarchal order that preserved vulnerability,
precarity, and disenfranchisement in foreign women by continuing the use of
matrilineage for nonmarital children.
In Guyer, a white American citizen fathered two nonmarital foreign-born
sons with a woman “of African descent.”
112
When the American citizen father
died, he bequeathed land in America to his sons. Upon recognizing the
contestability of the sons’ claims to citizenship, two other white men (the
“interlopers”), challenged the sons’ claim to the property. The jus sanguinis
citizenship statute relevant at the time allowed for citizenship transmission to
foreign-born children but was silent on the marital status of the parents.
113
Despite the intentions of the individual citizen father, as a matter of systemic
policy, the Guyer court declared that foreign-born “illegitimate” children of
American fathers were not citizens under the statute.
114
Like Dred Scott and § 1409, Guyer did many things at once. It illustrates
how white heteropatriarchy uses both citizenship and property laws to allocate
sovereignty to itself and vulnerability to others. It exemplifies white
heteropatriarchy’s unrelenting fundamental compulsion and need to control
vulnerable bodies in space, specifically lines of inheritance and ownership. It
shows the resiliency of white heteropatriarchy in using both citizenship and
property laws to exclude racialized foreign others from the polity and preserve
the ability to engage in sexual conduct with foreign women without the burdens
of parenthood as a matter of societal policy, ratified in law. Furthermore, and as
Collins demonstrates in granular detail, for decades after Guyer, administrators,
judges, and legislators enlisted the antebellum-slavery-based matrilineage-
outside-of-marriage/patrilineage-inside-marriage distinction to ensure racial
purity in the polity and the continued sexual control of foreign women. As
110. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2149 (noting that fifteen days before Guyer was
decided “Maryland adopted a new state constitution that abolished slavery and declared that ‘all men are
created equally free’” (citing BARBARA JEANNE FIELDS, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM ON THE MIDDLE
GROUND: MARYLAND DURING THE NINETEENTHCENTURY 131 (1984))).
111. Id. at 2141.
112. Id. at 2140.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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Collins demonstrates, for decades, these decisionmakers denied the citizenship
claims of nonwhite children, especially those who were excludable under the
race-based immigration and naturalization laws, in an effort to ensure racial
purity.
115
C. Whiteness, Hypermasculinity, and Hypersexualized Foreign Women: The
Driving Forces of American Immigration and Citizenship Law
Whiteness, hypermasculinity, and the narrative of hypersexualized foreign
women have coursed through the veins of citizenship transmission since the
founding.
116
They are the three organizing tenets that govern the field of
citizenship. These three straps in the WHP have shaped and designed the entire
regulatory field, and the boundaries and contours of America.
117
Section 1409 is
merely one in a myriad of laws that use the legal category of citizenship as a
means of granting or denying rights, creating vulnerability for purposes of
exploitation, and distributing resources and burdens.
118
Derivative citizenship
laws involve a quagmire of statutes, administrative decisions, and policy
practices. However, three unifying principles explain the chaos: (1) the need for
racial purity and white supremacy; (2) the sanctioning of white women for
having sex with foreign men; and (3) the creation and maintenance of
vulnerability in foreign women for hypermasculine sexual exploitation.
As for whiteness, citizenship as a legal mechanism is the primary site of
“racial formation.”
119
It is where America not only constructs itself as white,
120
but also bulwarks its porous boundaries against “aliens” and simultaneously
perfects its ability to exploit.
121
Since its inception, America has used the legal
category of “citizenship” to make America synonymous with whiteness.
122
In its
very first citizenship act, the Naturalization Law of 1790, Congress explicitly
115. Id. at 2137-38.
116. Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1680; see also
Chang, supra note 38 (arguing that the regulation of sex is a central tenet of U.S. immigration policy);
Eithne Luibhéid, Heteronormativity, Responsibility, and Neo-liberal Governance in U.S. Immigration
Control, in PASSING LINES: SEXUALITY AND IMMIGRATION 69 (Brad Epps et al. eds., 2005) (“Sexuality
has long been a concern to the framers of U.S. immigration law and policy, and it has consistently
comprised an important axis for the regulation of newcomers.”).
117. Collins, A Short History, supra note 15, at 1492 (“The history of U.S. citizenship law cannot be
understood without due recognition of racism’s central role in shaping the entire regulatory field.”).
118. Freddy Funes, Note, Beyond the Plenary Power Doctrine: How Critical Race Theory Can Help
Move Us Past the Chinese Exclusion Case, 11 SCHOLAR 341, 342 (2009).
119. OMI&WINANT, supra note 28 at 1-3.
120. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 40, at 1119.
121. See Collins, A Short History, supra note 15, at 1496.
122. See LÓPEZ, supra note 28. For a much more detailed history that centralizes race, see Collins,
Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6. For a much more detailed history of derivative citizenship statutes that
centralize gender, see Collins, Note,When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36.
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restricted naturalized citizenship to “free, white persons.”
123
Whiteness remained
the gold standard when Congress passed racially exclusionary immigration laws,
including the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882,
124
the Immigration Act of 1891,
125
and the Geary Act of 1892.
126
Although there were amendments to this “whites
only” restriction, racial bars to naturalization were not fully extirpated until
1952.
127
White supremacy, however, was not the only driving force shaping
immigration policy. As in Dred Scott, the creation, maintenance, and regulation
of sexual subjugation were also guiding principles in American citizenship and
immigration law. The demonization and perennial hypersexualization of Asian
women also typify the centralized role of sex and sexual conduct regulation in
immigration law. Stewart Chang argues that Asian women, particularly Chinese
women, were monolithically constructed as pernicious prostitutes, the antithesis
to normative American sexuality, a foreign peril that threatened the integrity of
American domestic unity. Quoting historian Nayan Shah, Chang explains,
“[D]uring the nineteenth century anti-Chinese advocates characterized Chinese
immigration as a racial war where the most pernicious weapon was the Chinese
female prostitute, who . . . was ‘infusing a poison into the Anglo-Saxon blood’
and imperiling the future of the American nation.”
128
Capitalizing on the
stereotype of Asian women as immoral and sexual deviants, President Ulysses
S. Grant signed the Page Act of 1875, which restricted the immigration of
Chinese womenwhowere presumed to be prostitutes.
129
Following the Page Act,
the Chinese Exclusion Act was just one of a myriad of laws that systemically
excluded Asians, including the renewal of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1884,
1888, and 1892.
130
The 1917 Immigration Act created the “Asiatic Barred Zone,”
123. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795) (limiting jus sanguinis
citizenship to the children of U.S. citizen fathers; restricting naturalization to “free white” persons).
124. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943).
125. Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084.
126. Geary Act of 1892, chs. 60-61, 27 Stat. 25 (repealed 1943).
127. See LÓPEZ, supra note 28. It should be noted that in addition to congressional acts, the Supreme
Court has consistently held that that “[t]he power of exclusion of foreigners [is] an incident of sovereignty”
and that therefore questions arising from the exercise of that sovereignty “are not . . . for judicial
determination.” Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889). Furthermore, until 1965,
American citizenship laws standardized racial and national-origins restrictions. See Kristin A. Collins,
Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family in Morales-Santana, 131 HARV. L. REV. 170, 180 n.64 (2017)
(“Race-based immigration and naturalization laws and race-salient national-origins quotas were gradually
repealed starting in the 1940s and were finally repudiated by Congress in the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), and in the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).”).
128. Chang, supra note 38 at 240 (quoting NAYAN SHAH, CONTAGIOUS DIVIDES: EPIDEMICS AND
RACE IN SAN FRANCISCO’S CHINATOWN 107 (2001)).
129. Id. (citing Page Act, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (1875) (repealed 1974)).
130. See generally H.R. Res. 282, 112th Cong. (2011) (resolution regretting the passage of
discriminatory laws against the Chinese beginning in the nineteenth century).
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which prohibited immigration from most of Asia.
131
The Immigration Act of
1924 followed, which extended exclusion to all “alien[s] ineligible for
citizenship,” including Asians.
132
According to Chang, throughout the nineteenth
century, the Asian prostitute was politically manipulated as a racial other against
which normative citizens and immigrant subjects who could racially and
culturally belong in America were defined.
133
In addition to whiteness, heteropatriarchy governed the laws associated with
citizenship transmission. Beginning in 1790, white citizen fathers had the right
to transmit citizenship to their marital foreign-born children provided that the
mother was also white and otherwise eligible for naturalization.
134
White married
citizen mothers, however, did not have the right to transmit citizenship to their
white marital foreign-born children until 1934.
135
Racial purity requires control
over women’s bodies; thus, under the Expatriation Act of 1907, female citizens
automatically forfeited citizenship if they married an alien, a practice known as
marital expatriation.
136
The same act prohibited women from transmitting
citizenship to their foreign-born children.
137
As Collins argues, “Prior to 1934, the text of the derivative citizenship
statute recognized only the foreign-born children of citizen fathers as citizens,
thus using the patrilineal norms that had long characterized domestic relations
law to regulate [white] membership in the American polity.”
138
As inDred Scott,
outside marriage, matrilineal lineage was recognized for foreign-born nonmarital
children.
139
As in Dred Scott, the foreign mothers of nonmarital children,
fathered by American men abroad, were not citizens. Following matrilineal
norms outside marriage allowed citizen men to continue sexual engagement with
foreign women free of legal responsibilities for fathering children.
Collins further argues that the primacy placed on marriage to secure the
transfer of citizenship to foreign-born children was no accident; rather, the
centrality of marriage “remained a vital and racially exclusionary principle from
131. Immigration Act, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 876 (1917) (repealed 1952).
132. Chang, supra note 38, at 268 (quoting Immigration Act, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924) (repealed
1952) (restricting immigration for all “alien[s] ineligible for citizenship” and setting an annual quota of
150,000 immigrant entries per year based on national origin, where immigration from each eligible nation
was limited to two percent of the number of foreign-born persons of that nationality residing in the United
States as of the 1890 census)).
133. Id. at 242.
134. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2235 (citing Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3,
§ 1, 1 Stat. 103, 104 (repealed 1795)).
135. Id. (citing Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1993, 48 Stat. 797).
136. Collins, A Short History, supra note 15, at 1490 (citing Expatriation Act of 1907, ch. 2534, § 3,
34 Stat. 1228).
137. Expatriation Act of 1907, ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228.
138. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note 127, at 178–79 (footnotes omitted);
see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 462 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In 1855, Congress
clarified that citizenship would pass to children born abroad only when the father was a United States
citizen.” (citing Act of February 10, 1855, § 2, 10 Stat. 604)).
139. Collins, A Short History, supra note 15, at 1490.
88 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 31:1
the late nineteenth century into the early twentieth century. The marriage
requirement was racially exclusionary because marriage was not a race-neutral
institution.”
140
The Supreme Court did not declare miscegenation laws
unconstitutional until 1968.
141
According to Collins, the marriage requirement
was also racially exclusionary because immigration administrators constrained
definitions of marriage and legitimacy in cases involving citizenship claims of
nonwhite children.
142
The 1922 Cable Act terminated marital expatriation; thus, marriage to an
alien no longer forfeited a woman’s citizenship automatically.
143
A woman,
however, still lost her United States citizenship if she married an alien ineligible
for citizenship, such as Chinese men.
144
In 1934, Congress passed an
immigration act that allowed citizen-mothers, for the first time, to confer
citizenship on their children.
145
Under the Nationality Act of 1940, Congress
preserved equality in the transmission of citizenship to marital children based on
the parent’s sex, but established a completely different scheme for nonmarital
children, one that discriminated on the basis of marital status and the sex of the
parents.
146
Nonmarital foreign-born children of citizen mothers were
automatically entitled to citizenship. Nonmarital foreign-born children of citizen
fathers, however, acquired citizenship only upon legitimation or adjudication of
paternity during the child’s minority.
147
Drawing from Collins, by recognizing
mothers as the source of parental responsibility for nonmarital children and
preserving a father’s prerogative regarding his nonmarital children, the 1940 Act,
like coverture, shielded men from the burdens of childcare and support for their
non-marital offspring.
148
140. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2182–83.
141. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
142. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2154.
143. Cable Act of 1922, ch. 411, § 3, 42 Stat. 1022.
144. Id. at §§ 3, 5.
145. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, 48 Stat. 797. The Act amended § 1993 of the Revised Statutes to
read:
Any child hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose father
or mother or both at the time of the birth of such child is a citizen of the United States; but the
rights of citizenship shall not descend to any such child unless the citizen father or citizen
mother . . . has resided in the United States previous to the birth of such child. In cases where
one of the parents is an alien, the right of citizenship shall not descend unless the child comes
to the United States and resides therein for at least five years continuously immediately
previous to his eighteenth birthday, and unless, within six months after the child’s twenty-first
birthday, he or she shall take an oath of allegiance to the United States of America.
48 Stat. 797, supra.
146. Nationality Act of 1940, §§ 201, 205, 54 Stat. 1138-40; see Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra
note 6, at 2150.
147. Nationality Act of 1940, §§ 201, 205, 54 Stat. 1138-40.
148. See Laura Weinrib, Protecting Sex: Sexual Disincentives and Sex-Based Discrimination in
Nguyen v. INS, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER&L. 222, 234 (2003). As Collins notes, the common law imposed
a duty on women of nonmarital children to care for those children, but protected men from the property,
support, and status claims of those children. Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties,
supra note 36, at 1683.
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Before turning to the next section, there are a few features of citizenship
transmission that require highlighting. It is important to note that § 1409, like
marriage expatriation, is an example of coverture,
149
a continuum of laws that
regulated or controlled women’s bodies for purposes of racial purity, regulated
women’s sexual practices outside marriage through the sanction of parenthood,
and legally ratified sexualized violence.
150
Like coverture, § 1409 incorporated
the common law regime that allocated the rights and responsibilities of
parenthood according to marital status and parental gender.
151
As Collins argues,
“The history of coverture and the transmission of American citizenship brings
an elementary point into focus: the allocation of parental rights is always
correlated with the allocation of parental responsibility.”
152
Drawing from
Collins, this basic legal truism and its numerous implications for citizenship law
suggests that the gendered injustice caused by § 1409 is its creation and
perpetuation of a legal regime that squarely fixates full responsibility for foreign-
born nonmarital children on women, while allowing men to escape and to
continue engaging in unprotected hypermasculinity free of reproductive
sanction. As Collins argues, “Once we recognize this gendered operation of
§ 1409, broader failures of equal protection analysis come into relief.”
153
Furthermore, both slavery and coverture allowed men to solidify their
dominance over women and set the stage for modern approaches to derivative
citizenship.
154
The ideologies, discourses, and strategies that entrenched
citizenship and property codes in antebellum slavery and coverture continue to
have tremendous traction in our shared societal consciousness, particularly in the
narratives that justify racialized and sexualized domination as exemplified in
victim blaming, slut shaming, and the ways in which the bodies of women
continue to be viewed as the property of men, discussed inmore detail in Section
III.C. Although women’s formal legal status has changed, contemporary
approaches to derivative citizenship reflect a racialized commitment to female
subordination.
155
149. Coverture, in the common law, defined marital unity as a merging of a married couple into a
single person—the “head” of the marriage—the husband. SeeNANCYF. COTT, PUBLICVOWS:A HISTORY
OFMARRIAGE AND THE NATION 11-13 (2000); CANDICE LEWIS BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER
OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP (1998); JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND
INJUSTICE: A LEGALHISTORYOFU.S.WOMEN (1991); M. Isabel Medina,Derivative Citizenship: What’s
Marriage, Citizenship, Sex, Sexual Orientation, Race, and Class Got to Do with It?, 28 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
391, 453 (2016).
150. Coverture included a continuum of laws that created a right in men to dominate women,
including marriage as a status contract, regulation of divorce and child custody, legal treatments of
women’s obligations for housework and child care, lack of recognition of marital rape, and legal
sanctioning of domestic violence. Elizabeth Beaumont,Gender Justice v. the “Invisible Hand” of Gender
Bias in Law and Society, 31(3) HYPATIA J. FEMINIST PHIL. 668, 676 (2016).
151. Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1672.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1681.
155. Beaumont, supra note 150, at 676.
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D. World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam: Foreign Woman As
“Whore” and the Military Sex Trade
It is imperative to contextualize § 1409 in the hypermasculine sexual ethics
of the American military. As Susan Zeiger notes, war engagements are powder
kegs for sexual exploitation from the brothels of the French demimonde, to the
German bordellos, to sprawling “camp towns,” often military-run, that provided
sex trafficking for American GIs in Korea, the Philippines, Okinawa, Vietnam,
and Thailand.
156
As Zeiger notes, the loneliness, fear, boredom, lust, and racially
exoticizing and fetishizing tastes of servicemen combined with the economic
vulnerability of foreign women detonate sexual exploitation.
157
American
military engagements are primary sites for hypermasculinity with all the
trappings incident to sexualized violence, including exponential incidents of
rape.
158
When contextualizing § 1409 in the hypermasculine sexual practices of
156. ZEIGER, supra note 45.
157. Id. at 19-20 (“Having endured the ‘rigors of the front,’ these men were eager to be sexually
serviced.”) It should also be noted that the glove-like fit between war and sexual exploitation is not unique
to the United States. See, for example, the comfort women the Japanese made of Korean women, rape as
warfare in the Congo, and the former Yugoslavia.
158. Because sexual assault is a severely underreported crime, no one can know just how pervasive
the culture of sexual assault is in the American military, let alone how often American servicemen sexually
assault when they are abroad. Thirty-three percent of women in the militarywill experience sexual assault.
Approximately twenty percent of all rapes for military personnel get reported. See Kristina B. Wolff &
Peter D. Mills, Reporting Military Sexual Trauma: A Mixed-Methods Study of Women Veterans’
Experiences Who Served from World War II to War in Afghanistan, 181 MIL. MED. 840 (2016). Between
nine and a half and thirty-three percent of women report experiencing either an attempted or completed
rape during their military service. See Juleyka Lantigua-Williams, Taking Military Sexual Trauma
Seriously, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/
women-vets-and-mst/498866? [https://perma.cc/85VE-S426]. Approximately one out of every five
women in the United States is raped in her lifetime. For a woman in the military, her chances of being
raped increase to one out of every three women. Kristina Bell et al., When Public Institutions Betray
Women: News Coverage of Military Sexual Violence Against Women 1991-2013, 10 J. INTERDISC.
FEMINIST THOUGHT 1 (2017). Of the 5,277 service members who reported an incident of sexual assault
that occurred during military service, 4,193 were women, while 1,084 were men. The number of women
had increased by thirteen percent from the previous year. Lisa Ferdinando, DoD Releases Annual Report
on Sexual Assault in Military, U.S. DEP’T OFDEF. (May 1, 2018), https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/
Article/1508127/dod-releases-annual-report-on-sexual-assault-in-military [https://perma.cc/AC2M-PJ
RA]. Women in combat are 180 times more likely to be sexually assaulted by a fellow soldier than killed
by the enemy. The Military’s Sexual Assault Epidemic, THE WEEK (Mar. 31, 2013),
http://theweek.com/articles/466100/militarys-sexual-assault-epidemic [https://perma.cc/JZ4M-6PNH].
Up to thirty-six percent of women veterans screened at Virginia treatments centers showed signs of trauma
from either sexual abuse, harassment, or assault which occurred while on active duty. See Valerie A.
Stander & Cynthia J. Thomsen, Sexual Harassment and Assault in the U.S. Military: A Review of Policy
and Research Trends, 181 MIL. MED. 20, 21 (2016). If these reported rates of sexual assault within the
military itself are any indication of the pervasiveness of a sexual assault culture in the American military,
where there are legal protections for American service men and women, then one might reasonably assume
that assault culture abroad is even more expansive.Moreover, the military is characterized by a patriarchal
structure that emphasizes masculine ideas, dominance, and control. This is demonstrated in instances
when men primarily dominate leadership and high-ranking positions. The military’s hypermasculine
dynamic is associated with the acceptance and perpetration of sexual assault, where a man’s sense of
patriarchal entitlement makes it easier for them to justify sexual assault. The men’s feelings of entitlement
to regular sex is perceived to be the link between masculinity and rape-related attitudes. Carl Andrew
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the American military, three themes emerge: (1) governmental prohibition of
marriage between American servicemen and racialized foreign women; (2)
military facilitation of sex trafficking between servicemen and racialized foreign
women; and, as Collins has argued, (3) the combined impact of governmental
policies that restricted marriage with racialized foreign women and the
facilitation of sexual exploitation led to a disproportionate number of racialized
nonmarital foreign-born children being abandoned by their fathers.
159
History is replete with examples of both Congress and the American military
restricting interracial marriage. As Zeiger chronicles, the government’s
repression and condemnation of interracial relationships was a central feature of
marriages between members of the military and foreigners from World War I
through the Korean War and the Vietnam War: “In World War I, for instance,
U.S. military and civilian authorities took a paternalistic stance toward white
soldiers” and white foreign women, “determined to ‘protect’ them from sexually
promiscuous foreign women.”
160
When it came to black soldiers, however, in
addition to an outright ban on interracial marriages, military officials warned
allies of the sexual danger that black servicemen posed to the white women of
other nations.
161
In another example, the American Expedition Forces threatened
a Filipino-American serviceman with statutory rape charges for attempting to
marry a German woman with whom he had fathered two children.
162
In World War II, the government, with the support of the military,
maintained its ban on interracial soldier marriage. In 1945, the War Brides Act
explicitly excluded womenwhowere “ineligible for citizenship” because of their
race, such as Asian women, and the privilege of preferential immigration status
was denied to them.
163
As Collins argues, “The racial prohibitions incorporated
into the War Brides Acts meant not only that a soldier could not bring his racially
excludable wife home, but also—pursuant to explicit military policy—that the
soldier would not likely be given permission to marry his racially excludable
girlfriend in the first place.”
164
Continuing through the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the military actively
thwarted marriages between soldiers and their Asian girlfriends,
165
but facilitated
Castro et al., Sexual Assault in the Military, 17 MIL. MENTAL HEALTH 2-3 (May 16, 2015),
http://cir.usc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Sexual-Assault-in-the-Military.pdf [https://perma.cc/VA
4Q-D67M].
159. See Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6.
160. ZEIGER, supra note 45, at 6.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 36.
163. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2208 (citing War Brides Act, Pub. L. No. 79-271,
§ 1, 59 Stat. 659, 659 (1945) (excluding brides under immigration laws from preferences provided in
Act)).
164. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2208-09.
165. Rose Cuison Villazor, The Other Loving: Uncovering the Federal Government’s Racial
Regulation of Marriage, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1361, 1407-11, 1429 (2011).
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and encouraged sex trafficking.
166
Citing Zeiger, Collins explains this duality
and its impact on nonmarital foreign-born children:
[A]s Zeiger demonstrates, during the Vietnam War the military
“vigorously and systematically discouraged marriage for American
service personnel in Vietnam, placing a wide array of bureaucratic and
financial obstacles in front of marriage aspirants.” Instead, drawing on
a set of conventions and practices that had emerged during the Korean
War, the military encouraged nonmarital sexual liaisons between
American soldiers and local women, including long-term “contract”
arrangements. The children born to such relationships were illegitimate
and hence not American citizens.
167
As in the Korean War, during the Vietnam War, the American military
actively facilitated a sex trafficking culture, through “R & R” programs, for
example, which facilitated sexual exploitation between servicemen and foreign
women.
168
In elaborating on the impact of the duality of racially restrictive
marriage policy and military-facilitated sex trafficking, Zeiger argues the
combined policies shared a common core:
The intention to preserve and extend male control over women. This
intention was overt in regard to prostitution. The image of a military
red-light district, guarded by American MPs, surrounded by a wall
topped with broken glass, and staffed by army “inspected” prostitutes,
is an apotheosis of female disempowerment. But crucial features of
overseas marriage policy during World War II also created a wall of
male control around the foreign brides of American servicemen. The
procedures for wives to enter the United States and the establishment of
paternity claims were both areas in which the alien spouse was denied
standing to act independently and on her own behalf. In the matter of
paternity, an alien woman, married or unmarried, who had given birth
to the child of a U.S. serviceman had no access to child support, nor the
child, access to citizenship, unless the American father formally agreed
to recognize the child. Similarly, though a GI dependent was,
166. ZEIGER, supra note 45, at 79; Bruce Cumings, Silent but Deadly: Sexual Subordination in the
U.S.-Korean Relationship, in SAUNDRA POLLOCK STURDEVANT & BRENDA STOLZFUS, LET THE GOOD
TIMES ROLL: PROSTITUTION AND THE U.S. MILITARY IN ASIA 169 (1992); see also Linda Trinh Võ &
Marian Sciachitano,Moving Beyond “Exotics, Whores, and Nimble Fingers”: Asian American Women in
a New Era of Globalization and Resistance, 21 FRONTIERS: J.WOMEN STUD. 1, 4 (2000) (“The trafficking
of Asian women as commodities in the global sex trade continues because of the U.S. military presence
in Asia, the sex tour industry in Asia, and the Asian mail-order bride business. The construction of Asian
women as hyperfeminine erotic exotics who willingly and passively service male desires has contributed
to these thriving sex industries.” (citation omitted)).
167. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2211 (citing ZEIGER, supra note 45).
168. ZEIGER, supra note 45, at 79-80.
2019] “Johnny and the WHP” 93
theoretically, eligible for transportation to the United States, only the
American serviceman could file a transportation request.
169
As the result of American military bases in Philippines, thousands of
Filipino mothers filed a $68 million dollar lawsuit arguing that America had a
legal responsibility to educate and provide medical care for an estimated 8,600
Amerasians in Olongapo, the site of Subic Bay Naval Station, about the size of
Singapore.
170
The court filings described the Navy’s direct role in the local bar
and sex industry, where the Navy helped regulate the clubs, some of which were
owned by Navy officers or retirees. They registered 15,000 to 17,000
“hospitality” women and gave them information and medical care aimed at
limiting venereal disease. The Navy also approved off-base apartments where
many sailors lived with girlfriends.
171
In remarking on Olongapo, one Navy
Judge Advocate stated, “[W]e participated in creating the world’s biggest
brothel. Olongapo is called ‘the city of 10,000 whores.’”
172
In describing the
carnival-like atmosphere of the brothels for American servicemen, the judge
advocate stated:
If you’re an impressionable young kid, and you’re taken in tow—
outside to Olongapowhich is just row after row of bars, massage parlors,
and no-pretext brothels—what does that do to a young kid’s view on the
value of women?
These gals would do the most degrading things—and do them in public.
And it was always in a group. A gal would come along to a table in a
bar and literally “serve” all the guys at the table. It was always in groups.
In fact, girls would do tricks with their bodies and orifices on stage—
that was very common. One game was to have the girl go under the table
and fellate each guy—and whoever’s face cracked soonest would buy
the next round of drinks. This was true in all the enlisted bars—in the
officer clubs there wouldn’t be the group sex, but there would be group
performances.
169. Id.
170. Bruce Lambert,Abandoned Filipinos Sue U.S. Over Child Support, N.Y.TIMES (June 21, 1993),
https://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/21/world/abandoned-filipinos-sue-us-over-child-support.html
[https://perma.cc/3KMC-MXCQ]. Olongapo had the largest prostitution trade near any military base in
Asia. Approximately 15,000 to 17,000 sex workers worked in Olongapo and neighboring towns. An
estimated 9,000 of these women worked in over 330 bars, massage parlors, and other “entertainment”
establishments in Olongapo. Elizabeth Kolby, Comment, Moral Responsibility to Filipino Amerasians:
Potential Immigration and Child Support Alternatives, 2 ASIAN L.J. 61, 64 (1995).
171. Lambert, supra, at 173.
172. Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War and Military Culture, 45 DUKE L.J. 651, 711-
12 (1996).
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Subic Bay was an automatic stop for all the ships in the Pacific. So all
the guys experienced this. This was not just a few of the guys or some
small proportion; this was all the guys . . . .
That place was a circus. If I had to guess at the percentage of sailors—
officer and enlisted—who never partook of those activities in Olongapo
and Subic, I’d guess five percent.
The one thing that strikes me is: I don’t think it’s possible to
overestimate the influence of places like Olongapo. And these included
graduates of the top law schools in the country—and we were all
affected by it . . . . I mean I can’t overstate it; it was beyond anything
I’d ever seen or ever have seen since . . . . The whole carnival
atmosphere cannot be overstated.
173
This fun-filled, carnival-like frat house circus contrasts sharply with the utter
squalor American servicemen, with insatiable appetites for unprotected “One
Dollar Chicky-Chicky Girls,” create for their abandoned children, described in
more detail in Section III.C. The descriptions above provide context for the
property right Congress gives these servicemen to go abroad and “Let the Good
Times Roll”
174
without any fear that their offspringmight show up at their Senate
hearings, houses of worship, and family gatherings to remind Dad, his family,
and his community of all those raucous fun-filled nights, all the laughter, and all
the giggling. The images also reflect the moral bankruptcy of the American
military in facilitating and subsidizing sex trafficking while restricting interracial
marriage and the life chances of children Americans fathered. As Collins
poignantly argues, the combined restrictions on interracial marriage, particularly
to racialized foreign women, and the military’s active facilitation of sex
trafficking, particularly with racialized foreign women, along with the derivative
citizenship laws enacted by Congress, resulted in “the predominantly white
babies of World War II soldiers [becoming] citizens and ‘baby boomers,’ while
a very significant population of nonmarital Amerasian babies were excluded and
became ‘bui doi’—children of the dust.”
175
III. JOHNNY, HISWHP, ANDHIS SUPPORTING CAST OF CHARACTERS, JEZEBEL
ANDOFFRED
Congress, with the Supreme Court’s blessing, has equipped citizen men with
both a dagger and a shield when traveling abroad and spreading their seed.
173. Id. at 711–12.
174. See generally STURDEVANT& BRENDA STOLZFUS, supra note 166.
175. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2213.
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Section 1409 is a weapon to engage in hypermasculinity liberated from the
shackles of reproductive burdens and responsibilities—freed from reproductive
punishment or sanction. Under § 1409, men have a right—which is so valued
that it rises to the occasion of a property interest—to proclaim to the world, “I
want to whore all I want without a care in the world,” and to not suffer the
reproductive sanction or punishment of forced parental responsibility against
their male prerogative, autonomy, and freedom.
Section 1409 is a direct descendant of antebellum chattel slavery: using the
legal category of citizenship, § 1409 perfects sovereignty in white
heteropatriarchy and vulnerability in racialized and gendered others. According
to Joseph Singer, “the legal system makes constant choices about what interests
to define as property.”
176
Moreover, “[s]tate power defines and allocates property
rights, and property rights, in turn, allocate power and vulnerability. Seemingly
neutral definitions of property rights by the courts [and Congress] distribute
power and vulnerability in ways that construct illegitimate hierarchies based on
race, sex, class . . . and sexual orientation.”
177
In § 1409, Congress delegated to
citizen men the sovereign power of “the legal category of citizenship,” which
functions like property. In § 1409, Congress conferred upon citizen men a
package of entitlements that work on the valences of white, male, and
hypermasculine supremacy, taken together as white heteropatriarchy. Under
§ 1409, citizen men have the right of exclusion, what Cheryl Harris calls “the
conceptual nucleus of whiteness”—the right to discard and exclude their children
from the American polity, which is historically and consistently synonymous
with whiteness. As part of the package of entitlements, § 1409 gives American
men the power to abandon their children to circumstances tantamount to
destruction. As Joseph Stigler states, “Ownership, with the attendant right to
exclude others, confers power on the owner—power to deny other people things
they need to live.”
178
In having the right to exclude and destroy, citizen men can
continue the right to control, use, and enjoy foreign women free from the
responsibilities and regulation of parenthood. Section 1409 turns foreign women
into things to be used and their offspring into stuff to be discarded. If property is
a legal relation among persons with respect to things, then § 1409 creates a legal
relation of racialized and gendered sexual subordination shared between citizen
men with respect to foreign women. Section 1409, like property, creates a stable
basis of expectation with respect to sexual control over foreign women because
it mitigates the burdens of parenthood. To the extent that property is inherently
distributional,
179
§ 1409 allocates a valued resource, citizenship.
176. Harris,WAP, supra note 18, at 1791 n.82 (quoting Joseph W. Singer, Sovereignty and Property,
86 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 47 (1991)).
177. Id. (quoting Singer, Sovereignty and Property, at 8).
178. Singer, supra note 41, at 1322.
179. Joseph W. Singer, Property, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 240, 249 (David Kairys 3d ed. 1998).
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In § 1409, Congress has given men a right to mitigate any duty or
responsibility owed to their children or the mothers of their children, under
American law. Furthermore, Congress has granted American men a birthright to
either create American citizens or to exclude and destroy them. At the same time,
Congress has suppressed the ability of foreign women to create American
citizens. Foreign women are good enough to sexually exploit, but not to create
American citizens outside of wedlock. The right Congress gave to citizen men
in the form of a choice as to the citizenship of their children mitigates the rights
and decision making of foreign women who birth American citizens. The
decision is one of male prerogative.
Through this process, whiteness, maleness, and hypermasculinity take on
the character of property in much the same way as Cheryl Harris’s “whiteness as
property,”
180
where whiteness, maleness, and the heteropatriarchal familiast
ideal become the governing organizing principles of all space—citizenship.
Whiteness is the touchstone and talisman of American entitlement and sense of
belonging. Section 1409 is “male” in that it is an exclusively male prerogative.
It is heteropatriarchal familiast in that § 1409 extends a property right, part of the
package of entitlements, which encompasses the right to engage in
hypermasculine sexual performance freed from reproductive sanction or
punishment—free from the consequences of creating children. This Article
refers to the entire process outlined in this Part III as a white heteropatriarchal
property right in philandering, sexual exploitation, and rape (the “WHP”).
The WHP is a conceptual model that negates the claim that § 1409 emerged
from the biological and natural differences between men and women. On the
contrary, the WHP exposes § 1409 as the product of foundational choices—
choices about the relationship between rights and power.
181
The WHP casts
§ 1409 as a form of property that, as a social institution, privileges the rights of
men to perform hypermasculinity on foreign women and discard their children.
The WHP exposes Congress’s creation of an institution and social arrangement
that distributes a highly significant social good—citizenship—and justifies
privilege. The WHP places § 1409 in a moral framework, so that its obfuscating
layers, hidden presumptions, and allocation of rights and duties can be
scrutinized and measured against a society that pledges allegiance to liberty and
justice. The WHP questions whether § 1409 is an outlier in a society that rejects
forms of social life and political systems, like slavery, as a way of organizing
control over humans.
182
In its foundational choices, § 1409 creates a property
system inconsistent with the norms governing a free and democratic society that
treats each person with equal concern and respect.
183
As discussed in more detail
180. Harris,WAP, supra note 18.
181. Singer, supra note 41, at 1323.
182. Id. at 1325.
183. Id. at 1336.
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in Part V, § 1409 stands at odds with the rhetoric surrounding abortion rights and
women’s reproductive integrity, specifically the morality of sexually responsible
behavior, the sanctity of human life, and the responsibilities and duties of
parenthood.
This Part lays the theoretical underpinnings for the claim that § 1409 creates
the WHP. Drawing from Cheryl Harris and other modern theories of property,
Section III.A further explicates § 1409 as a property right. Drawing from
Anthony Farley and Angela Harris, Section III.B explicates the hypermasculine
performance aspect of the WHP. Finally, Section III.C introduces Jezebel, the
whore, the Aristotelian evil snare of men, and Johnny’s doppelganger. She
embodies the narrative of victim blaming that allows Johnny to engage in
treachery and still maintain his innocence. She is part of the cast of characters
embedded in the DNA of § 1409. She becomes the hidden justification, “slut
shaming,” in the interpretive base and doctrine that protects § 1409 from equal
protection challenges in four Supreme Court cases, discussed in Part IV. Just as
Jezebel symbolizes foreign women, Offred embodies citizen women. Offred is
the main character in Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale, which depicts
a dystopian universe where women are banished to reproductive enslavement
and harvesting.
184
Offred is the citizen woman automatically saddled with
parental responsibility.
185
A. The WHP as Property
According to Cheryl Harris, “whiteness as property” names the concept that
whiteness is a form of property because (1) whiteness is constitutive of what it
means to be a free person; (2) the law excludes others from whiteness (strictly
policing its boundaries); and (3) crucial legal rights and advantages flow from
whiteness.
186
Whiteness satisfies the functional criteria of property because it
includes the enjoyment of rights and privileges as well as the dominion over land,
bodies, and other forms of materiality. By both shielding white people from the
vulnerability that comes from lacking rights, land, or wealth, and conferring
upon white people the ability to materially increase their power, white
personhood confers a kind of property right that solidifies white supremacy
conceptually, spatially, and ontologically.
187
According to Harris, property is
possessed not only in the form of land, but in the form of white personhood.
184. MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID’S TALE (Anchor Books Penguin Random House ed.
1998).
185. I mention Offred here because she is the subject of upcoming scholarship—a companion piece
that argues that § 1409 creates moral and legal accountability, as well as equality asymmetry with laws
involving abortion and the criminalization of women for birthing drug-dependent children. Although some
of these arguments are explored in this piece, future scholarship will explore those ideas in depth.
186. Harris,WAP, supra note 18, at 1725-30.
187. Id. at 1713.
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White personhood, according to Harris, is exclusively given the powers of
possession, which manifests materially in the owning of property, immunity
from legal harm, and the subordination of non-whites.
188
Whiteness itself is the
property of being able to possess rights, power, immunities, as well as land and
human beings. White people have created supremacy in themselves by making
property of others. Drawing from Harris, and as Andrew Krinks observes,
whiteness is the preeminent mode of ownership and power and, in turn, has the
authority to bend blackness to its will. Whiteness becomes the Earth because
whiteness subsumes everything into itself, likewise materially manifesting itself
onto the world, such that blackness can both literally and figuratively function
as intrusion or trespass, simply for existing in what is sometimes explicitly or
implicitly understood as “white space”
189
or America.
Drawing from Harris, § 1409 is where the monopolization of citizenship in
the hands of citizen men traveling abroad, and the propertization of foreign
bodies conflates ideologically, doctrinally, and materially: citizenship is where
white heteropatriarchy perfects sovereignty in itself and vulnerability in others
through a kind of statelessness
190
—a place without rights, what Chief Justice
Taney called, “no rights which the white man was bound to respect”
191
—and a
place implemented by force and ratified by law.
192
Citizenship, therefore, polices
the boundaries of whiteness at the nation’s border as a means of preserving the
material and psychological benefits of whiteness as well as lines of
inheritance.
193
Section 1409 sets the boundary between the American polity and
racial “filth,” bringing down the value of white cleanliness and societal order.
Section 1409 draws a divide between America and inestimable numbers of
foreign women whose sexual exploitation by American men marks them as the
undesirable “other” imperiling white space and societal cleanliness.
Section 1409 keeps foreign women and their children fathered by American men
frozen as “dirty secrets” petrified in the white heteropatriarchal mind and a
material world of limitless exploitation beyond the border far, far away.
Harris provides the connection between property and relationships of
domination and exploitation in the following:
[P]roperty is a legal construct by which selected private interests are
protected and upheld. In creating property “rights,” the law draws
boundaries and enforces or reorders existing regimes of power. The
188. Id. at 1725-30.
189. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 40, at 1121.
190. Harris,WAP, supra note 18, at 1715 (“Although the systems of oppression of Blacks and Native
Americans differed in form—the former involving the seizure and appropriation of labor, the latter
entailing the seizure and appropriation of land—undergirding both was a racialized conception of property
implemented by force and ratified by law.”).
191. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857).
192. Id.
193. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 40, at 1119.
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inequalities that are produced and reproduced are not givens or
inevitabilities, but rather are conscious selections regarding the
structuring of social relations. In this sense, it is contended that property
rights and interests are not “natural,” but are “creation[s] of law.”
194
Under § 1409, Congress, with the Supreme Court in tow, has made a choice
to grant the WHP legal status, which allocates and distributes power and
vulnerability for the express purpose of sexual domination and commodification.
These choices are not the product of physiological differences between men and
women, but rather, valued access to foreign women for hypermasculine
purposes. Section 1409 is where citizen men become ideological propositions
enforced through power, and foreign women and their nonmarital children
become ideological propositions imposed through subordination, all of whom
exist in a material reality of power and control that § 1409 creates.
195
Under
§ 1409, citizen men become weapons of law and a resource deployable at the
social, political, and institutional level to maintain control over foreign women
and their children while engaged in the sexual exploitation of foreign women.
196
Under § 1409, the legal mechanism of citizenship maneuvers, much like
property, to endow white heteropatriarchy with both the ideological and material
right to exclude, possess, control, enjoy, transfer, and destroy.
197
In that way,
§ 1409 satisfies the functional criteria of property.
198
Like property, § 1409
creates rights and privileges in white heteropatriarchy, and it also creates duties
in foreign women and their offspring, namely to respect the rights and privileges
in American men and to accept their own denigration at the hands of American
men. Section 1409 creates “outside” children. In this way, property not only
protects value, it creates value. Section 1409 protects and creates value in
whiteness and vulnerability in foreignness. It protects and creates value in
maleness and vulnerability in femaleness. It protects and creates value in
194. Harris,WAP, supra note 18 at 1730.
195. Id. (“The law constructed ‘whiteness’ as an objective fact, although in reality it is an ideological
proposition imposed through subordination. This move is the central feature of ‘reification’: ‘Its basis is
that a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a ‘phantom objectivity,’
an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental
nature: the relation between people.’”).
196. Id. at 1734 (“The state’s official recognition of a racial identity that subordinated Blacks and of
privileged rights in property based on race elevated whiteness from a passive attribute to an object of law
and a resource deployable at the social, political, and institutional level to maintain control.”).
197. Charles R. Lawrence III, Passing and Trespassing in the Academy: On Whiteness As Property
and Racial Performance As Political Speech, 31 HARV. J. RACIAL&ETHNIC JUST. 7, 30 (2015). (quoting
Harris,WAP, supra note 18, at 1736 (“The right to exclude was the central principle, too, of whiteness as
identity . . . . [t]he possessors of whiteness were granted the legal right to exclude others from the
privileges inhering in whiteness; whiteness became an exclusive club whose membership was closely and
grudgingly guarded.”).
198. Harris, WAP, supra note 18, at 1731 (arguing that whiteness functions as property in the right
to exclude, possess, transfer, use, dispose, and enjoy).
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heteropatriarchal sexual performance and the material circumstances necessary
to sexually exploit.
At the core of whiteness is what Harris calls its conceptual nucleus of
exclusion.
199
Making whiteness a kind of property “reproduces black
subordination” by default, because the construction of whiteness as superior and
as the access to wealth, property, and citizenship, is not possible apart from the
dehumanization of blackness.
200
Thus, whiteness not only sets up the dichotomy
of insider and outsider, but by positioning itself inside the circle of rights and
privileges and situating the other outside the charmed circle, it also establishes
racial hierarchy that enables the vulnerable conditions for exploitation. In
Harris’s words, “The fundamental precept of whiteness—the core of its value—
is its exclusivity. But exclusivity is predicated not on any intrinsic characteristic,
but on the existence of the symbolic Other . . . .”
201
In other words, as with many
objects generally in a capitalist society, the thing in and of itself lacks value. The
ability to exclude creates value. Valorized whiteness requires dehumanized
blackness in order to be powerful materially and symbolically. If whiteness is
property, then blackness is always trespass.
202
Drawing from Harris, the “white” in the WHP is the right to exclude from
the American polity, which is synonymous with whiteness. The driving force in
the bundle of rights, or package of entitlements, that § 1409 confers to citizen
men, regardless of their race, is the right to exclude, which structurally assumes
whiteness. In fact, and as discussed in more detail in Part IV, which analyzes the
Supreme Court cases that have addressed § 1409, it is the power of exclusion
that triggers Congress’s plenary power in areas of immigration. It is also
Congress’s plenary power that has shielded § 1409 from amore exacting scrutiny
than would otherwise apply to explicit race, gender, or nationality disparity in
other areas of law.
203
As Harris states, “American law has recognized a property
interest in whiteness that although unacknowledged now forms the background
against which legal disputes are framed, argued, and adjudicated.”
204
Moreover,
§ 1409 not only policies the boundaries of white space, but it also sets up a
perimeter around foreign women against whom citizen men form their masculine
identities through hypermasculine sexual performance. And then, in an endless
199. Id. at 1714; see also Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 40, at 1153; MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE
NEW JIM CROW 257-58 (2012) (“[A]n aspect of human nature is the tendency to cling tightly to one’s
advantages and privileges and to rationalize the suffering and exclusion of others.”).
200. Harris,WAP, supra note 18 at 1731.
201. Id. at 1789.
202. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 40, at 1156-57. This concept might also explain why black
equality, for some whites, looks like trespass, a feeling some characterize as being left behind.
203. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) (“In the exercise of its broad power over
naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to
citizens.”); Michael G. McFarland, Derivative Citizenship: Its History, Constitutional Foundation, and
Constitutional Limitations, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 467, 509 (2008).
204. Harris,WAP, supra note 18, at 1714.
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stream of ironies, the foreign woman’s sexual exploitation by American men
becomes yet another reason to deny her children citizenship. As discussed in
more detail in Part IV, the Supreme Court has justified the constitutional
solvency of § 1409 by raising the evil specter of millions of war babies ready to
raid the government coffers, and an equal number of menacing foreign women
who do not know the identities of their children’s fathers; thus, the sexual
immorality and depravity of these foreign women become yet another reason to
deny their children access.
Extending from Harris, § 1409 creates the WHP. By conferring a package
of entitlements to citizen fathers, more specifically by granting citizen fathers
the right to exclude their nonmarital foreign-born children from the polity—to
deny them citizenship—§ 1409 vests in these men not just a right to exclude their
children, but a right to effectively destroy them, while simultaneously investing
in these fathers a biopower to continue the sexual possession, control, use, and
enjoyment of foreign women. The following chart is a visualization of theWHP.
Figure 1: Visualization of the WHP
To further illustrate the power conferred by § 1409 and to humanize the
claim that § 1409 creates a right in citizen fathers to abandon their children in
circumstances tantamount to destruction, consider the following passage from
Bonnie Kae Grover, describing the “bui doi,” “children of the dust,
205
the
205. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2213. Similarly in the Philippines, the
Amerasians, fathered by Americans, are known as “throwaway children,” “bye, bye, Daddy,” “half
dollar,” or “souvenir.” Lambert, supra note 170. They live on the margins, endure high rates of poverty
and ill health even by Filipino standards, and are frequently abandoned as infants or raised by young single
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children American military men fathered and abandoned during the Vietnam
War, when America was out spreading democracy.
206
These discarded children
are now middle-aged and living in squalor facilitated by their American fathers
and the societal policies embedded in § 1409:
Most Amerasians were born to working class women and thus lack the
education and resources to relocate to the United States or even make
contact with their fathers. Many of them look strikingly occidental, but
far from conferring an advantage, their Western appearance subjects
them to scorn and derision. Vietnam is a relatively homogeneous society
in which Amerasians cannot hide that their mothers consorted with a
hated enemy. Some mothers abandoned their children, placed them in
orphanages, or gave them to relatives to raise. Today, they are subject
to intense discrimination. Most cannot find jobs and live on the streets
or lead lives of crime and prostitution. Many live in official compounds
built for their protection or otherwise depend on the government for
safety. There has been little public pressure to make amends and little
hue and cry in the United States to try to relieve the conditions under
which these children live.
207
In sum, modern theories of property explain the power of the WHP and its
formidable strength in the face of constitutional challenge. Although many laws
that facially discriminate on the basis of gender have been overturned, partially
because their explicit gender references trigger a greater burden of justification,
§ 1409 remains entrenched. It remains resilient because it protects a time-
honored property right behind the obfuscating glare of legal doctrine’s power to
ratify the settled expectations of white heteropatriarchal privilege as natural—
the legitimate natural baseline—evinced in the biological differences between
Feelings on American Return, WASH. POST (May 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
asia_pacific/filipino-children-of-us-sailors-and-soldiers-have-mixed-feelings-on-american-return/2016/
05/15/a12b8a7a-1621-11e6-971a-dadf9ab18869_story.html [https://perma.cc/3W3D-MLBL].
206. “No one knows how many Amerasians were born—and ultimately left behind in Vietnam—
during the decade-long war that ended in 1975. In Vietnam’s conservative society, where premarital
chastity is traditionally observed and ethnic homogeneity embraced, many births of children resulting
from liaisons with foreigners went unregistered.” David Lamb, Children of the Vietnam War,
SMITHSONIANMAG. (June 2009), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/children-of-the-vietnam-war-
131207347 [https://perma.cc/ZUB3-EDAJ]. Congress enacted legislation in 1987 giving Amerasians
special immigration status. James Dao, Vietnam Legacy: Finding G.I. Fathers, and Children Left Behind,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/16/us/vietnam-legacy-finding-gi-
fathers-and-children-left-behind.html [https://perma.cc/7BAL-QNAL]. Since then, more than 21,000
Vietnamese Amerasians have relocated to the United States. Dao, supra. “It is also estimated that there
are roughly 50,000 Filipino Amerasians, due to the United States’ 94-year occupation of the archipelago
from the Spanish-American War in 1898 until withdrawal in 1992.” Emily von Hoffmann, The Forgotten
Americans: Meet the Abandoned Children of U.S. Military Servicemen Abroad, PIXEL MAG. (Nov. 19,
2015), https://medium.com/pixel-magazine/the-forgotten-americans-meet-the-abandoned-children-of-u-
s-military-servicemen-abroad-3fc54f8cd8f3 [https://perma.cc/7L23-3WKN].
207. See Bonnie Kae Grover, Aren’t These Our Children? Vietnamese Amerasian Resettlement and
Restitution, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y& L. 247, 254 (1995).
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men and women, which cannot be disturbed without overturning the entire
natural order.
208
Part IV illuminates how the Supreme Court has entrenched and
legitimated the settled expectations of the WHP through the obfuscating might
of nature and biology, turning those hegemonic maneuvers into legal doctrine,
which reifies a material reality of sexualized racial domination.
Before turning to the performative aspects of the WHP, it is imperative to
highlight the novelty of this article, and that is the value of applying a property
rubric to § 1409; centralizing the lives of racialized women as the interpretive
base for a critique of § 1409; and the value of intersectional analysis to unearth
the pernicious endurance of the WHP. Although the current controversy
surrounding § 1409 is rightfully multifaceted, a property analysis is absent from
the dialogue and debate. And yet a property perspective is ubiquitous in § 1409.
Applying a property rubric to citizenship reveals that both citizenship and
property share the same conceptual nucleus—exclusion. Property involves how
society recognizes value,
209
how society organizes space, and how society
organizes people in space. Drawing from Harris, white heteropatriarchy has
usurped all space and relegated vulnerable bodies to particularized places, for
the purpose of exploitation. Space, therefore, becomes hierarchical on the
valences of race, class, and gender. In restricting the movement and actions of
nonmarital foreign-born children, Congress has fundamentally framed § 1409 as
a property interest. In § 1409, Congress is grappling with what to do with
disposable children—how to physically cordon them off from the American
polity—how to leave them behind as a “dirty” and “dark” secret.
Not just Congress, but the Supreme Court, in immunizing § 1409 from equal
protection challenges, has justified § 1409 as protecting government coffers,
legitimate lines of inheritance for citizen men, and the nation’s (white)
boundaries from undesirability, in the form of nonmarital foreign-born children
and their immoral mothers. Section 1409 is a direct descendant of antebellum
slavery: it is where citizenship and property collude to render foreign women
vulnerable to hypermasculine performance. From the standpoint of property, it
allows American men to treat both foreign women and their own children as if
they were nonhuman, much like slave laws allowed white men to treat their own
enslaved children and the mothers of those children as property. It makes
208. Harris, WAP, supra note 18, at 1714 (“After legalized segregation was overturned, whiteness
as property evolved into a more modern form through the law’s ratification of the settled expectations of
relative white privilege as a legitimate and natural baseline.”).
209. Quoting James Madison, Cheryl Harris states:
In James Madison’s view, for example, property ‘embraces everything to which a man may attach
a value and have a right,’ referring to all of a person’s legal rights. Property as conceived in the
founding era included not only external objects and people’s relationships to them, but also all of
those human rights, liberties, powers, and immunities that are important for human well-being,
including: freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, freedom from bodily harm, and free and
equal opportunities to use personal faculties.”
Harris,WAP, supra note 18, at 1726.
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children fathered by American men trespassers on American soil. It makes
individual citizen men border agents at the nation’s white borders materially,
psychically, and aesthetically—defending the nation’s boundaries from
penniless vagrants, bringing down the value of whiteness with racialized filth.
Citizenship, like Harris’s whiteness as property, confers tangible and
economically valuable benefits and is jealously guarded as a valued possession,
allowed only to those who meet a strict standard of proof.
210
In immunizing
§ 1409 from equal protection challenges, the Supreme Court is engaged in a turf
battle—warfare—protecting the nation from undesirability, particularly
racialized trespassers fathered by American men, discarded and left behind. To
the extent that property law and property rights have an inescapable distributive
component,
211
Congress has distributed a set of rights and privileges to citizen
men that work along the valences of whiteness, hypermasculinity, and foreign
female subjugation—the three straps in the WHP. Moreover, as discussed in
more detail in Part IV, each of the Supreme Court cases that have upheld § 1409
can be read as the Supreme Court’s defense of property interests embedded in
the WHP. Finally, applying a property rubric to § 1409 reveals it as a white
heteropatriarchal project—fundamental to white heteropatriarchal identity
formation, whereby sexually subjugated foreign women become a rite of passage
in masculine identity formation, American immigration and citizenship policy,
and American imperialism.
B. The WHP as Performance
In arguing that § 1409 creates a property right in white heteropatriarchal
performance on vulnerable bodies, I reference several theorists. Most
immediately, I reference Anthony Farley and his seminal article The Black Body
as Fetish Object, particularly Farley’s argument that black bodies have provided
platforms, canvasses, stages, and theater for the formulation and formation of
“whiteness.”
212
Farley argues, “The white identity is created and maintained by
decorating black bodies with disdain, over and over again”
213
and that “[r]ace is
a form of pleasure in one’s body which is achieved through humiliation of the
Other and, then, as the last step, through a denial of the entire process.”
214
Whiteness, as an identity, emerges out of this discourse; for “[i]f the black body
is the site and cite of all ills, then the white body is not.”
215
Moreover, once the
black body, and by extension foreign women, particularly foreign nonwhite
women, is branded as the site for all ills, it provides carte blanche for sexual
210. Id.
211. Singer, Property, supra note 179, at 249.
212. Farley, supra note 105, at 464.
213. Id. at 463.
214. Id. at 464.
215. Id. at 475.
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exploitation because the foreign body, and foreign land, become an
indispensable justification for sexual domination and canvass for unbridled
sexual fantasy.
216
Far from aberrant, these performances are endemic to the formation of white
heteropatriarchal identity, and by extension, American sovereignty. It is through
these performances that white heteropatriarchy takes material shape. Angela
Harris, citing Elaine Scarry, maps out the connective tissue between these
performances on vulnerable bodies and the creation of sovereignty, dominion,
and control:
Literary theorist Elaine Scarry argues that one of the properties of
human pain is that its characteristics—its vibrancy, its reality, its
certainty—can be transferred away from a human body and onto
something else, something that in itself does not appear vibrant, real, or
certain. In this sense, pain, and the violence that induces it, is a means
of creation, a way of making ideas real, the way bloodless ideas such as
property and sovereignty are made real in war and conquest by the
presence of actual blood and the mutilation and destruction of human
bodies.
217
In the context of § 1409 and its history, white heteropatriarchal performance
on vulnerable bodies, including philandering, sexual exploitation, and rape, is a
way of materializing an idea about inferiority and superiority, entitlement and
property, sovereignty and vulnerability, and belonging and statelessness upon
the foreign female’s very flesh. Such an inscription is a form of maintaining
power over foreign women. It is a modality of domination. Section 1409 enables
a performance on vulnerable bodies that functions as an identity formation, a rite
of passage, that draws the line between domination and subjugation.
Section 1409 facilitates a male citizen release valve through the inscription of
sexualized performance on foreign women, creating a hierarchy of mastery and
submission and superiority and inferiority, which taken together reestablishes
masculinity.
C. Johnny’s Doppelganger Jezebel—the Whore and Aristotelian Evil Snare of
Men
Jezebel is Johnny Appleseed’s necessary mirror image, foil, or
doppelganger—the foreign woman as “whore” and Aristotelian evil snare of
men. Johnny Appleseed, of course, is the embodiment of white heteropatriarchy,
216. See id. at 475. (discussing the branding power of narratives of supremacy to justify the use of
black bodies as places for a canvass for both pleasure and humiliation).
217. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, supra note 24, at 781.
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wielding hisWHP. Joan Tarpley defines Jezebel as “the wanton, libidinous black
woman whose easy ways excused white men’s abuse of their slaves as sexual
‘partners’ and bearers of mulatto offspring.”
218
Stacey Floyd-Thomas explains
“the Aristotelian evil snare of men” as the necessary supporting narrative of rape
culture and sexualized regimes of violence. As she explains, “[s]ex is an
undisciplined result of a body overtaking its soul—a powerful force that drives
men more than it does women, yet one nonetheless caused by women. Since the
mind should control the body, sexual activity should be controlled as well.”
219
Interrelated patterns of sexism follow suit, for as kings and warriors, men are
superior and must guard both their bodies and those of women who are subject
to a “strict watch.”
220
According to Floyd-Thomas, when men rape women, it is
because women have used their bodies to ensnare the soul of men:
As a result, misogyny is rational, and heterosexism is a virtue. Likewise,
sexual activity should be severely restricted for women of the same
social and economic class as the men whose sexual needs are so
powerful and demanding, but it is nonetheless allowed and encouraged
for men with “lower-class” women (women outside the circle of
dominant-class men).
221
Hypersexualized, exoticized, and licentious, Jezebel embodies a form of
victim blaming that reflects a discourse of domination. She is the narrative and
direct outgrowth of laws that made vulnerable bodies property (e.g., Dred Scott
and laws of coverture).
222
Victim blaming normalizes exploitation because the
pathology of the perpetrator is rendered invisible by blaming the victim. Victim
blaming is a fundamental precept of hegemony because it explains societal order
as the fault of its victims. Jezebel, the whore, or the snare, is a quintessential
counterpart to Johnny, the embodiment of white heteropatriarchy: through the
snare (victim blaming), Johnny can engage in hypermasculinity and treachery
and still maintain his innocence—and the importance of Johnny’s innocence can
never be imperiled, questioned, or undervalued. No matter how treacherous,
Johnny must always be innocent and his actions utterly deniable. By way of
example, it is the constant over-pathologizing of vulnerable women, which leads
218. Joan Tarpley, Blackwomen, Sexual Myth, and Jurisprudence, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1343, 1345
(1996) (defining Jezebel as “the wanton, libidinous black woman whose easy ways excused white men’s
abuse of their slaves as sexual ‘partners’ and bearers of mulatto offspring”).
219. BEYOND THE PALE: READING ETHICS FROM THE MARGINS 12 (Stacey M. Floyd-Thomas &
Miguel A. De La Torre eds., 2011). This view of women, particularly loose women, as the Aristotelian
Evil Snare of Men, is also reflected in the books of the Old and New Testaments. See Proverbs 23:27-28
(“For a whore is a deep ditch; and a strange woman is a narrow pit. She also lieth in wait for a prey, and
increaseth the transgressors among men.”); 1 Corinthians 6:13 (“Now the body is not for fornication, but
for the Lord; and the Lord for the body.”).
220. BEYOND THE PALE: READING ETHICS FROM THEMARGINS, supra note 219.
221. BEYOND THE PALE: READING ETHICS FROM THEMARGINS, supra note 219.
222. Cook, Stop Traffic, supra note 8.
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to their (over)criminalization. It explains why we incarcerate women who give
birth to children dependent upon illicit substances, but we allow Johnny to spread
his seed all over the globe and discard his children. As another example, the
American military sometimes facilitated the circumstances in which servicemen
fathered children—for instance, by establishing “R & R centers”—but that
facilitation did not factor into Justices Stevens’s and Kennedy’s opinions
upholding the constitutionality of § 1409. They instead justified upholding
§ 1409 in part because they believed that many foreign women “do not know the
identity of the fathers.”
223
The hypersexualized, fetishized, and racialized narrative of Jezebel, as seen
in the Supreme Court’s references to foreign women who do not know the
identities of the fathers of their children, is what allows Johnny to engage in
treachery and sexual transgression while maintaining his innocence. Jezebel is
the foreign women whose demonization provides cover for Johnny’s
pathology—his whoring. Jezebel is also the exoticized footstool for Johnny’s
unbridled and unhinged sexual fantasy and fetish. She is the “goings on” between
master and enslaved in the dirty slave shacks. Jezebel renders Johnny’s
hypermasculinity obfuscated, hidden from view, and latent because the focus
shifts from Johnny’s WHP onto the hypersexualized body of a racialized foreign
woman. To be clear, Jezebel is not a reflection of how foreign or racialized
women are, but rather, what white heteropatriarchy needs them to be.
224
She is a
deliberately created fiction to render invisible the pathology of the WHP. She is
one aspect of a complex set of images and mythology that deny humanity in
order to rationalize exploitation.
225
In the lexicon of the master, she is an “evil”
deserving of rape and barred from the big house along with her disposable
children.
Jezebel, like the libidinous enslaved woman and the exoticized Asian
woman, is simultaneously a product of white heteropatriarchal fantasy, sexual
conduct, deniability, and excuse. By way of illustration, victim blaming was a
narrative created and sustained by the American military to justify sexual
exploitation and to provide a defense and justification for rape. The narrative
serves a two-fold purpose: both of which perfectly track the workings of implicit
bias and the pathological gaze: it (1) over-valorizes the innocent men of the
military and (2) pathologizes foreign women. It concretizes the concept of the
American warrior as pure and at the mercy of the foreign woman as evil and
transcended.
226
According to Susan Zeiger, victim blaming created a veil,
223. Collins, Note,When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1702; Kolby, supra
note 170, at 63-65 (discussing the U.S. government’s role in encouraging the growth of prostitution in
Angeles City, just outside Clark Air Force Base, and Olongapo, next to Subic Bay Naval Stations, both
in the Philippines).
224. Chang, supra note 38, at 250, 261 (2015).
225. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 80, at 1437.
226. ZEIGER, supra note 45, at 15.
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providing the right conditions to perpetuate the sexual exploitation, but to hide
it from public approbation that might undermine public support for the war. In
other words, it hid it in plain sight for continued pleasure, but cloaked it for
protection from condemnation.
227
Section 1409 facilitates the sexual exploitation
of foreign women, but is enshrouded with obfuscating veils to assuage guilt and
to remain hidden so that the viewer of the American scene can continue to
participate in the implicit bias bubble, where one can consciously and
simultaneously commit treachery, wallow in ignorance, steep oneself in denial,
and then claim, “Oh my goodness. Well . . . I just didn’t know.”
As developed in more detail in Part IV, the Supreme Court has deployed the
evil snare to immunize § 1409 from gender-based equal protection challenges.
When the Court submerged § 1409’s gender disparity in “the problems of
determining paternity” and foreign womenwho did not know the identity of their
children’s father, the snare becomes part of the victim blaming process that
inverts the gaze of pathology from the perpetrator to the victim, further
obfuscating the perpetrator’s treachery. This move is key in the context of § 1409
because it becomes part of the government’s justification for § 1409 and is
adopted in the majority opinions by both Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy,
military men.
228
In their majority opinions, the snare is lurking in the
background. Johnny and Jezebel are engaged in what Angela Harris calls a
Manichean
229
struggle of good and evil, where the innocent Johnny falls prey to
the conniving trickery of the evil Jezebel and must be liberated by the Supreme
Court.
IV. THE SUPREMECOURTOPINIONS AND THREE STRAPS IN THEWHP—
WHITENESS, HYPERMASCULINITY, AND FEMALE SUBORDINATION
On four separate occasion in the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has
had an opportunity to bring § 1409 in line with modern standards of decency that
mark the maturation of an advancing nation. The Court has, however, declined
such advancement. The Court has instead erected legal narratives that ratify and
normalize white heteropatriarchal entitlement, privilege, and power. The Court
has submerged the gender asymmetry in § 1409 into the natural differences
between men and women as well as Congress’s plenary power to police the
nation’s borders. In the last of the four cases, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the
majority, found that the more lenient physical presence requirement that applied
227. Id. (stating that “[p]olitical considerations also played a role, chiefly President Wilson’s need
to steer unsettled public opinion in support of the European war; an army with high moral standards was
an important condition of war support for many American voters, especially evangelicals”).
228. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 62 (2001).
229. Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudence of Victimhood, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 78.
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to female citizens, not males, violated the Equal Protection Clause.
230
In
fashioning a remedy, however, the Court applied the more onerous standard
applicable to men to women; thus, in a valiant effort to bring the gender
asymmetry in § 1409 in line with modern notions of fairness, the Supreme Court
preserved male privilege at the expense of women.
So why has § 1409 proven so resilient? It is resilient because it strikes at the
core of American identity: it perpetuates racial discrimination through gender
discrimination with an added bonus of hypermasculine sexual performance. As
such, it operates along three axes: (1) whiteness, (2) hypermasculinity, and (3)
female subjugation, the three straps in the WHP. Each of these axes become
justifying principles as the Supreme Court defends the property interests and
allocation of rights embedded in the WHP. As to the first category, “whiteness,”
in its earlier approaches to § 1409, the Court explicitly—and later implicitly—
found that § 1409 triggered Congress’s plenary power to police the nation’s
white borders against aliens and national security threats.
231
As such, with the
exception of Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion inMorales-Santana, the Court
has applied a diluted form of scrutiny, much lower than the constitutional
exacting applied to most explicitly discriminatory statutes.
232
As discussed in more detail in this Part IV, each of the opinions that have
upheld the constitutionality of § 1409 have raised the evil specter of the “alien”
in various forms to trigger using the plenary power doctrine to shield § 1409,
whether it was Congress’s recognized authority to protect the country from
communists, national security threats, Jezebel, millions of war babies, or
racialized deportable criminals. The massively destructive abandonment of
inestimable numbers of children fathered by American men was not viewed as
unconscionable, but rather became a reason to justify § 1409.
233
Both Justices
Stevens and Kennedy explicitly raised the enormous number of war babies, to
the tune of millions, to justify § 1409’s gender asymmetrical treatment between
men and women. As argued in more detail in Part V, both Congress’s and the
Supreme Court’s actions are not only lacking in morality, they are not in keeping
with the fundamental values of liberty, equality, and democracy. Moreover, as
argued in Part V, to the extent that the Court is poised to overturn Roe v. Wade
234
and wax eloquent about the sanctity of life, the morality of sexually responsible
behavior, and the responsibilities of parenthood, the attitudes adopted by the
230. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1698, 198 L. Ed. 2d 150 (2017).
231. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
232. Mariella, supra note 36, at 222 (arguing that there is “substantively diluted scrutiny of § 1409’s
gender classification, even though such sex-based classifications are typically reviewed under heightened
scrutiny”).
233. See Collins, A Short History, supra note 15, at 1494 (stating “it is not at all clear that a majority
of the sitting justices would consider it a problem, as a constitutional matter, that our citizenship laws
insulate male soldiers and the United States from citizenship claims by or on behalf of nonmarital foreign-
born children, regardless of the racial dimension of the phenomenon”).
234. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Court in cases involving § 1409 reveal a bankrupt moral hypocrisy lacking in
constitutional integrity.
The second axis along which the Supreme Court defended § 1409 is
hypermasculinity. Section 1409 shields hypermasculinity from the reach and
regulation of reproductive sanction and punishment. The Court has never
explicitly addressed the halo effect that § 1409 gives to male sexual prerogatives
outside marriage; however, it has dog-whistled this concern through empirical
evidence involving the number of men serving abroad and engaged in sexual
tourism. In dissenting opinions, both Justices Ginsburg and O’Connor have
remarked on the sexual prerogatives underlying § 1409. Justice Ginsburg noted
that “[t]here are . . . men out there who are being Johnny Appleseed,” and Justice
O’Connor articulated a similar concern, stating that our sex-based citizenship
laws are “paradigmatic of a historic regime that left women with responsibility,
and freed men from responsibility, for nonmarital children.”
235
As to the third category, “female subjugation,” § 1409 does three things.
First, it facilitates the regulation of citizened women’s bodies to ensure racial
purity in the polity by sanctioning them with automatic motherhood for birthing
nonmarital foreign-born children. As argued in more detail in Part V, this
automatic sanctioning is a form of reproductive regulation and punishment.
Second, § 1409 keeps foreign women prone to male power by dispossessing their
children, leaving both with little recourse or protection. Third, in upholding
§ 1409 against constitutional challenge, the Court regularly reaches for the snare.
In numerous passages, the Court states that the gender asymmetry in § 1409
results from “lurking” problems of paternity proof—code for untrustworthy,
loose foreign women or, more candidly, what Justice Stevens calls women who
may not know who the father is.
236
Thus, the Court has hidden the
hypermasculinity embedded in § 1409—the WHP—inside the snare—victim
blaming.
Using the Court’s three justifying principles—whiteness, hypermasculinity,












In particular, the Court’s contrasting approaches
235. See supra note 35.
236. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 65 (stating that “[g]iven the 9-month interval between conception and birth,
it is not always certain that a father will know that a child was conceived, nor is it always clear that even
the mother will be sure of the father’s identity”).
237. Flores-Villar v. United States involved a gender-based equal protection challenge to the
physical presence requirement in § 1409. 564 U.S. 210 (2011) (per curiam), aff’g 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir.
2008). However, the Court declined to reach this issue, and, in a four-four per curiam decision, affirmed
the lower court without opinion. As a result, I have not included Flores-Villar in my analysis.
238. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
239. 523 U.S. 420, 424-26 (1998) (Stevens, J.) (plurality opinion).
240. 533 U.S. at 56-57.
241. 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
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between Fiallo, Miller, and Nguyen, on the one hand and Morales-Santana, on
the other, demonstrate the need for historical contextuality and anti-
subordination principles
242
when deciding gender-based equal protection
challenges.
A. Fiallo: Immigration Preferences and Lurking Johnny
243
Fiallo addressed immigration preferences and was decided squarely within
the ambit of immigration law. Section 1409, by contrast, is a derivative
citizenship statute that confers citizenship at birth. Nevertheless, Fiallo laid the
doctrinal groundwork for the derivative citizenship cases considered in this Part
IV.
244
Fiallo established three doctrinal principles underlying § 1409 cases: (1)
white exclusion and the evil specter of alien undesirability; (2) male prerogative
and the doctrine of absenting fathers; and (3) the disturbing narrative of the
hypersexualized snare—all to justify the WHP.
In Fiallo, decided in 1977, a group of citizen fathers and their nonmarital
foreign-born children brought a gender-based equal protection challenge against
§ 101(b)(1) of the INA. Section 101(b)(1) excluded them from immigration
preferences.
245
More specifically, it excluded unwed fathers, but not mothers,
from the definition of “parent,” and their nonmarital children from the definition
of “child.”
246
Rather than separate Congress’s ability to expel or exclude aliens,
on the one hand, and Congress’s gender discrimination on the other, the Court
conflated the issues and rejected the plaintiffs’ claims.
247
The Court tucked and
elided Congress’s gender discrimination behind Congress’s plenary power,
applied rational basis review, and stated, “Our cases ‘have long recognized the
power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised
by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial
242. In describing the need for anti-subordination principles in vulnerability theory, legal scholar
Angela P. Harris states:
Vulnerability, in policy analysis, is commonly treated as a fixed characteristic of the population
or individual in question, rather than as the outcome of social and political relations. By
obscuring the political and institutional components of vulnerability, conventional policy
analysis has the potential to portray domination as difference, and to hide the problem of
unequal distribution of benefits and burdens within a universalist framework. Recognition of
vulnerability must therefore be supplemented with an explicit commitment to the anti-
subordination principle, which requires us to look for power and injustice even in our language
and our frameworks for research and policy.
Angela P. Harris, Vulnerability and Power in the Age of the Anthropocene, 6 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY,
CLIMATE& ENV’T 96, 148-49 (2014) [hereinafter Harris, Vulnerability and Power].
243. While Fiallowas decided squarelywithin the ambit of immigration law,Miller,Nguyen,Flores-
Villar, and Morales-Santana considered the derivative citizenship statute, which transfers citizenship at
birth. Antognini, supra note 14, at 413, 428. Nevertheless, Fiallo laid the doctrinal groundwork for the
derivative citizenship cases considered in this Part IV.
244. Antognini, supra note 14, at 413, 428.
245. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 791 (1977).
246. Id. at 781.
247. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note 127, at 189.
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control.’”
248
The Court narrowed the role for judicial review in immigration
cases and rejected heightened scrutiny in assessing the constitutionality of a
gender-based immigration statute, which Justice Thurgood Marshall, the only
person of color on the court, advanced in his dissent.
249
Instead, the Court held
that the gender explicit discriminatory selection criteria was reasonable “because
of a perceived absence in most cases of close family ties as well as a concern
with the serious problems of proof that usually lurk in paternity
determinations.”
250
1. The Evil Specter of Alien Undesirability as Threat
In an interesting analogy, the Court drew a parallel between alien threats to
national security, namely the Chinese, with the plaintiffs in order to justify
Congress’s plenary power to exclude. Citing Fong Yue Ting, one of the
foundational Chinese Exclusionary Act cases,
251
Justice Powell, writing for the
majority, implicitly analogized the plaintiffs, nonmarital foreign-born children
and their fathers, to vast hordes of Chinese invading white American soil who
will not assimilate. Using racialized alien invasion as justification, Justice Powell
deferred to Congress in matters of “the admission of aliens and their right to
remain” as a necessity, “touching as it does basic aspects of national
sovereignty.”
252
In drawing the analogy between the plaintiffs and hordes of
Chinese, the Court raised the evil specter of alien undesirability to justify
exclusion. The Court created a narrative of excludability premised on racialized
undesirability, potential criminality, and national security threat. The Court’s
likening plaintiffs to racialized aliens reveals the Court’s actual concern, as
opposed to the facts before the Court, which was policing the nation’s boundaries
from undesirability—the conceptual nucleus lying at the very heart of whiteness
in the WHP.
253
It is this foundational concern that will dilute the level of scrutiny
in the gender-based equal protection cases that follow Fiallo, specificallyMiller,
248. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210
(1953)).
249. Id. at 800 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note
127, at 189.
250. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799.
251. Id. at 792 (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)). Fong Yue Ting was
one of the Chinese Exclusionary Act cases, as well as a foundational case on plenary power, which, along
with Chae Chan Ping, evokes the imagery of Chinese as vast hordes invading the United States. Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
252. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792-93.
253. See Antognini, supra note 14, at 426-27; Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2154
(noting that well into the twentieth century, the Fourteenth Amendment notwithstanding, other formal
rules that governed membership in the American polity—such as immigration and naturalization laws—
were shaped in significant ways by racial nativism). It is clear that gender-based domestic relations law
principles incorporated into jus sanguinis citizenship law served a larger racially nativist nation-building
project.
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Nguyen, and Flores.
254
As explained in more detail in Section IV.E, Justice
Ginsburg’s opinion, writing for the majority inMorales-Santana, guts the use of
the plenary power doctrine to restrain constitutional oversight by the judiciary.
255
2. Absenting Fathers, a Dred ScottMove
As Albertina Antognini noted, in an exercise of judicial activism, the Court
relied on two justifications that were not actually in the record or capable of
observation: perceived absent fathers, as opposed to the actual ones that were
before the Court, and “lurking problems of proof,” as opposed to real ones.
256
Together, as Antognini argues, the “perceived absence” of close family ties and
the “serious problems of proof that usually lurk in paternity decisions” rendered
gender discrimination between men and women in Fiallo imperceptible.
257
The
invisible—absentee fathers and lurking problems of establishing paternity—
justified the visible gender disparity in the statute.
258
Furthermore, before the Court decided Fiallo, Collins argues that the Court
had begun to endorse nonmarital father’s rights in the domestic setting.
259
Given
the trend in doctrinal recognition of father’s rights, what accounted for the
Court’s normalizing absentee fatherism in Fiallo? The answer lies inDred Scott.
In Dred Scott, the Supreme Court understood that the white male right to discard
the child was essential to securing the sexual function of the enslaved female. In
Fiallo, therefore, absentee fatherism became, as Antognini argues, the Court’s
desired baseline
260
—the father engaged in hypermasculine conduct and yet freed
from parental responsibility—around which to construct material reality—the
WHP. Rather than honor patrilineage and fathers’ rights trending through
domestic common law, the Court set a baseline of the absentee father for
nonmarital foreign-born children.
261
The baseline assumed and normalized
absentee fatherism, making the invisible immunized from equal protection
254. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note 127, at 190.
255. Id. at 221.
256. Antognini, supra note 14, at 415 (stating “the Court articulated its reasoning in terms of that
which cannot actually be observed—a perceived absence as opposed to an actual one, and lurking
problems of proof as opposed to present ones”). Despite all the “lurking” elements the Court found,
including absent fathers, fraudulent paternity claims, criminality, and untrustworthy foreign women, the
Court did not find Johnny Appleseed.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note 127, at 188 (“By the time Fiallo was
decided, the Court had repudiated some of the limits on recognition of the relationship of a father and his
nonmarital child—limits that were standard in the common law and had been incorporated into modern
policies regulating the family.”)
260. Antognini, supra note 14, at 415, 417-18 (“[A] continuous theme runs through all these cases:
an unwed father, unlike an unwed mother, begins from an absence he must refute both in terms of proving
paternity and establishing the existence of a parental relationship with his child.”).
261. Id.
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challenges.
262
Drawing from Antognini, the Court endorsed the legal fiction of
an absent father because absenting fatherly responsibility for citizen men
sexually active abroad, unmarried, and with foreign women is exactly what the
Court sought to preserve:
263
what Hortense Spiller calls, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s
Maybe.”
264
In creating the fiction of the absentee father, the Court created a
material reality and normalized it.
Drawing from the work of Angela Harris,
265
the Court’s reasoning in Fiallo
exemplifies the absence of anti-subordination principles in legal reasoning. The
Court’s reference to “lurking problems of proof of paternity” is a proxy for two
things: (1) the “natural” differences between men and women and (2) sexually
loose, untrustworthy foreign women, who tell lies about paternity, Jezebel the
evil snare.
266
In a classic case of “slut shaming,” the Court takes the pathological
gaze off Congress and the WHP, and instead, fixates it on foreign women. The
problem in the statute, therefore, is due to the pathology of foreign women and
not male philandering or Congress creating and perpetuating inequality. The
problem becomes one of the individual—a foreign woman—and not the
institution that has created a power imbalance based on gender—Congress. In
fixating on the foreign woman’s “bad” choices, the Court masks Congress’s role
in perpetuating inequality. The inequalities Congress created in the statute get
obfuscated behind the pathology of foreign women. Similarly, the Court tucked
the gender inequality in the statute behind the biological difference between
maternity and paternity and diverted attention away from Congress creating
different social and political outcomes based on gender.
267
As Angela Harris
helps us understand, by deflecting away from the political and institutional
components of the gender asymmetry in the statute, the Court is portraying
domination as biological difference, and obfuscating the unequal distribution of
resources (citizenship) and burdens (parenthood) within the universalist
framework of nature.
268
3. The Aristotelian Evil Snare
Another basis for the Court’s rejection of plaintiffs’ sex discrimination claim
was the classical evil snare — “a perceived absence in most cases of close family
ties as well as a concern with the serious problems of proof that usually lurk in
262. Id.
263. Id. at 425.
264. Hortense J. Spillers, Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book, 17
DIACRITICS 65 (1987) (discussing children as the responsibilities of the mother and the prerogatives of
fathers); see also Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1706
(discussing same as enshrined in legal opinions addressing 1409).
265. Harris, Vulnerability and Power, supra note 242, at 146-47.
266. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 813 (1977) (citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771 (1977)).
267. Harris, Vulnerability and Power, supra note 242, at 146-47.
268. Id.
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paternity determinations,”
269
“when [paternity] depends upon events that may
have occurred in foreign countries many years earlier,”
270
far, far away. As
Antognini, however, argues “the element of the foreign was only suspect when
tied to determinations of paternity, as opposed to maternity.”
271
The government
was far more transparent, locating the “foreign,” in the promiscuity of foreign
women, stating very clearly:
Unlike the identity of the mother, which will often appear on the birth
certificate and which frequently can be corroborated by the testimony
of relatives, midwives, or medical personnel, the sole evidence that a
man has fathered a particular child is often the testimony of the
mother—and she may not know.
272
As Antognini notes, although the government portrayed the unwed foreign
mother as having numerous, even simultaneous, sexual partners such that she
may not know the biological father, these were not the foreign mothers before
the Court in Fiallo.
273
By raising the evil specter of the snare, the Court deflected
attention away from the unequal distribution of benefits and privileges in the
immigration preferences based on gender. Rather than focusing on the inequality
of the statute, the asymmetry was lost in the snare.
B. Miller: Paternal Acknowledgment and Heeeere’s Johnny
Miller set the stage for the Court’s white heteropatriarchal preoccupations,
both explicit and implicit, in the context of § 1409. In particular, Miller
reinforced three ongoing doctrinal principles underlying § 1409: whiteness,
hypermasculinity, and foreign female subordination, the three major straps in the
WHP. First,Miller reified America’s white exclusionary interests in policing its
borders: The lead plurality opinion framed and dog-whistled these issues as the
“war baby problem.”
274
Second,Miller ratified theWHP by submerging § 1409’s
gender disparity inside the physiological differences between men and women
when establishing paternity.
275
According to the lead majority opinion, men
should be required to do more when transferring citizenship than women should
because proof of paternity is subject to fraud. Again, the Court is masquerading
the WHP in concerns about the biological differences between men and women.
269. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799 (emphasis added).
270. Id. at 808 n.8.
271. Antognini, supra note 14, at 423-24.
272. Brief for Appellee, Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (No. 75-6297), 1976 WL 181347, at *44-
*45.
273. Antognini, supra note 14, at 417-18.
274. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
275. Id.
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Third, when dog-whistling concerns about problems proving paternity, the Court
is solidifying the narratives that justify the WHP, namely foreign woman as
snare.
276
In Miller, the Supreme Court found just the Madame Butterfly/Miss Saigon
trope it was looking for: a military man, a white male, who conducted military
service abroad, fathered a daughter out of wedlock
277
with a racialized foreign
woman (Filipina), left the foreign woman, and—in an extra gesture of Johnny
good ole’ innocence—may not have been aware of his racialized foreign child
when he returned to America. As a result of American involvement in Asian
wars during the twentieth century, inestimable numbers of children were born to
American servicemen and Asian women.
278
Miller was just this man. Miller
served in the Philippines, in 1970, during the Vietnam War. Although the exact
figures are unknown, in the Philippines alone, American servicemen fathered
approximately 30,000 to 50,000 children.
279
Miller never legitimated his
daughter and returned back to America. In order to transfer citizenship to his
daughter, the version of § 1409 applicable to Miller required that he establish or
acknowledge paternity before his daughter turned eighteen, which he failed to
do. Miller challenged the legitimation requirement in a gender-based equal
protection claim.
280
The decision inMiller resulted in highly fractured concurring and dissenting
opinions. Writing the lead plurality opinion, Justice Stevens, himself a military
man,
281
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, also a military man, rejected the equal
protection claim. Justice Stevens provided three highly dubious justifications for
the legitimation requirement: (1) it fostered ties between the child and
America;
282
(2) it encouraged “a healthy relationship between the citizen parent
276. Id.
277. Justice Stevens, one of the more liberal justices on the bench, makes much of Petitioner’s
“illegitimacy.” Miller, 523 U.S. at 424.
278. Kolby, supra note 170.
279. See id.
280. Although the petitioner in Miller raised the constitutionality of the gender asymmetry in the
derivative statute, a majority of the Court did not resolve the issue. Four Justices, in two different opinions,
rejected the challenge to the gender-based distinction, with two finding the statute to be consistent with
the Fifth Amendment. See 523 U.S. at 423 (Stevens & Rehnquist, JJ.) (plurality opinion) (concluding that
the Court could not confer citizenship as a remedy even if the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause
as a separation of powers issue). Id. at 452 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring). Three Justices dissented
and would have found the statute violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 460 (Ginsburg, Souter &
Breyer, JJ., dissenting). Id. at 471 (Breyer, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). Finally, two Justices did
not reach the issue as to the father, having determined that the child, the only petitioner inMiller, lacked
standing to raise the equal protection rights of their father. Id. at 445 (O’Connor & Kennedy, JJ.,
concurring).
281. John Paul Stevens, Letter to the Editor, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2007),
https://archive.nytimes.com/query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage-9903E0DF153DF937A35752C1A9619C8
B63.html [https://perma.cc/C6YH-7X28] (Justice Stevens was a naval officer at Pearl Harbor from 1942
to 1945).
282. Miller, 523 U.S. at 434 n.11; Pillard & Aleinikoff, supra note 33, at 10.
2019] “Johnny and the WHP” 117
and the child while the child is a minor;”
283
and (3) it ensured reliable proof of
paternity.
284
As in Fiallo, Justice Stevens’s justifications go to the heart of the
WHP: (1) whiteness, (2) hypermasculinity, and (3) foreign femaleness as snare.
1. Whiteness and the “War Baby Problem”
In grappling with questions about how to imagine and construct the
American polity, Justice Stevens emphatically voiced concerns about the war
baby threat to the nation’s borders and coffers. In both Miller and Nguyen,
military men feature prominently not only in the facts, but also the imagination,
discursive preoccupations, and reasoning employed by the Court.
285
In both
Miller and Nguyen, the military man was proxy for the inestimable numbers of
children abandoned by their fathers and threatening the government chest as well
as foreign Jezebels. Estimating the impact of § 1409 on the number of nonmarital
children abandoned by their fathers and imperiling the nation through sought-
after citizenship, Justice Stevens stated:
Given the size of the American military establishment that has been
stationed in various parts of the world for the past half century, it is
reasonable to assume that this case is not unusual. In 1970, when
petitioner was born, about 683,000 service personnel were stationed in
the Far East, 24,000 of whom were in the Philippines . . . . Of all
Americans in the military at that time, only one percent were female.
These figures, coupled with the interval between conception and birth
and the fact that military personnel regularly return to the United States
when a tour of duty ends, suggest that Congress had legitimate concerns
about a class of children born abroad out of wedlock to alien mothers
and to American servicemen who would not necessarily know about, or
be known by, their children. It was surely reasonable when the INA was
enacted in 1952 and remains equally reasonable today.
286
As Collins notes, rather than being a source of moral shame, sympathy, or
legal accountability, the sheer numbers of war babies, according to Justice
Stevens, is even more reason to insulate male soldiers and the United States from
citizenship claims by or on behalf of nonmarital foreign-born children, and to
shut the nation’s door to millions of hapless wards fathered by American men.
287
In a Ninth Circuit case raising a similar issue, Judge Andrew Kleinfeld was even
more blunt in his finding that Congress was well within its constitutional
authority to pass a statute that would minimize the burdens created by “paternity
283. Miller, 523 U.S. at 438.
284. Id. at 436.
285. Antognini, supra note 14, at 433.
286. Miller, 523 U.S. at 439 (1998).
287. Collins, A Short History, supra note 15, at 1485.
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and citizenship claims” asserted by “the women the [U.S.] soldiers left behind
and their children.”
288
“This may not be pretty,” he noted, “but it is a rational
basis for a sex distinction.”
289
Interestingly, the significant number of war babies undermined any claim
that the legitimation requirement encouraged ties. In fact, just the opposite, it
was one in a myriad of laws and administrative regulations intended to dissuade
American fathers from transferring citizenship.
290
Furthermore, it was intended
to protect not just the nation’s welfare coffers, but individual men from
inheritance and property claims from “illegitimate children” or the unexpected
nonmarital foreign-born visitor that might appear years later at the family
gathering, looking for “Daddy.”
2. Mama’s Baby, Johnny’s Maybe
Justice Stevens maintained that § 1409 would have survived intermediate
scrutiny because it did not involve sex discrimination; instead, the legitimate
biological differences between mothers and fathers and the legitimation
requirement for fathers equalized a mother’s right to abort.
291
In a series of
conflations, Justice Stevens reasoned that mothers and fathers did not engage in
legally relevant conduct before birth and that after birth, there remained no
legally relevant joint conduct unless the parties married, which would confer
citizenship.
292
In the case of an unwed mother and father, however, Justice
Stevens appeared to suggest that the legitimation requirement equalized a
mother’s right to abort with a father’s right to also decline parenthood.
293
In other
words, men should receive a right to decline fatherhood in exchange for a
woman’s right to abortion.
In many ways, Miller is a case study in the WHP. By grounding his
justification in biological determinism, Justice Stevens doctrinally enshrined the
baseline and hid it from constitutional scrutiny. Under Justice Stevens’s
obfuscating reasoning, the difference in citizenship transmission based on sex
was biological, and therefore, did not trigger gender discrimination. In
submerging disparity in nature, Congress as an institutional actor (1) engaging




291. Miller, 523 U.S. at 434 n.11, 444-45 (Stevens, J.) (plurality opinion); Collins, Note, When
Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1708. The distorted application of the Equal
Protection Clause should be noted: Abortion allows women to have sex without consequences (though
the burden is never shifted onto the man, whereas in the case of § 1409, the burden is shifted to the foreign
woman after the child is born).
292. Antognini, supra note 14, at 444.
293. Miller, 523 U.S. at 433 (“If the citizen is the unmarried female, she must first choose to carry
the pregnancy to term and reject the alternative of abortion—an alternative that is available by law to
many, and in reality, to most, women around the world.”).
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in an inequitable distribution of resources based on sex and (2) facilitating
hypermasculinity by limiting the legal consequences of these activities, is hidden
from view, constitutional or otherwise. When Justice Stevens argued that
because women have greater legal rights (the right to conceive or abort), women
should receive greater parental rights,
294
his reasoning reinforced the allocation
of full legal responsibility for nonmarital children to women, while preserving a
man’s sexual prerogatives and liberty, as well as a property right in
hypermasculinity.
295
Justice Stevens’s reasoning did what it was intended to do:
It perpetuated a regime that protects men’s ability to engage in sexual activity
outside marriage with mitigated responsibilities of parenthood.
296
As Collins
notes, by arguing the only legally relevant conduct happens after birth, when a
woman chooses to have a child, Justice Stevens sublimates the pre-birth joint
conduct of both men and women, rendering the pre-birth conduct irrelevant for
purposes of allocating parental rights and responsibilities.
297
Born or unborn, the
burden and responsibility of a nonmarital foreign-born child never shifts to the
father or his home country. Justice Stevens’s grounding of the gender asymmetry
in the physiology of women obfuscates § 1409’s true functions, which is to
maintain in men the right to regulate legitimate lines of inheritance and to be




Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Rehnquist, the two military men on the
court, made several dog-whistles to the suspicious circumstances in which
Miller, and most military men, fathered children abroad. As Justice Stevens
noted, “[D]espite recent scientific advances, it still remains preferable to require
some formal legal act to establish paternity, coupled with the clear-and-
convincing evidence standard to deter fraud.”
299
In another passage, Justice
Stevens famously stated that the foreign women who birth nonmarital foreign-
born children may not know who the father is.
300
In each of these passages, and
as elaborated more fully in the next section, the Court is submerging the
constitutional validity of § 1409, and by extension the use of the WHP, in the
victim blaming problems of loose women fraudulently claiming paternity on
poor innocent Johnny, the unwitting dupe, in desperate need of protection and
liberation by the Supreme Court.
294. Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1674.
295. Id. at 1673.
296. Id. at 1684.
297. Id. at 1700.
298. Id.
299. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 437 (1998).
300. Id. at 438.
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C. Nguyen: Paternal Acknowledgement and Johnny by Proxy
In 2001, the Supreme Court revisited § 1409’s legitimation requirement in
Nguyen v. INS.
301
In a five-four decision, the Court held that § 1409 withstood
another equal protection challenge. Like Charlie Miller, the Court seized upon
another military man. This time the Court found a military man by proxy.
302
Nguyen’s citizen father was not a serviceman, but a military contractor.
303
Nevertheless, the Court continued to rely on the military man, citing even more
empirical data about the vastness of servicemen stationed overseas during the
year Nguyen was born.
304
Although Nguyen’s father had raised his son, he had
not completed the legitimation process in § 1409(a)(4).
Justice Kennedy, sometimes the critical swing vote in matters of equality,
wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justice Stevens, who often sides with the
more liberal end of the Court except in matters concerning the sexual privileges
of his fellow servicemen, namely philandering while abroad. The more
conservative flank of the Court, Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, joined
the majority opinion. Justice O’Connor wrote a dissenting opinion, in which the
liberal arm of the Court joined: Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter. Engaging
an ahistorical formalistic approach, the majority grounded its rejection of
Nguyen’s challenge in the physiological differences betweenmen andwomen.
305
According to the majority, Congress had two legitimate interests in the gender
asymmetry of the statute: (1) men, unlike women, required additional biological
proof of paternity to guard against fraudulent conveyances of citizenship
306
and
(2) the legitimation requirement fostered ties between a child, father, and
nation.
307
In reaching its conclusion, the majority made several arguments, all of which
bear heavily on the WHP. First, the Court stated that citizen women abroad can
decide to have their child in America by traveling home, thus, conferring jus soli
citizenship. As a result, § 1409 automatically confers citizenship to citizen
women.
308
Men, on the other hand, have no control over where the child is born.
Second, in amplifying the narrative of foreign woman as snare and raising the
301. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 65 (2001).
302. Antognini, supra note 14, at 434.
303. Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1700.
304. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 65-66; Antognini, supra note 14, at 434.
305. Justice Kennedy shelved the separation of power question that had plagued constitutional
challenges to the derivative citizenship statute: whether the plenary power doctrine usurped the field of
judicial inquiry. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 61 (2001) (“Given [the determination that the statute survives
heightened scrutiny], we need not decide whether some lesser degree of scrutiny pertains because the
statute implicates Congress’ immigration and naturalization power.”). Instead, he concluded that the
statute survived even under heightened scrutiny. Id.
306. Id. at 62.
307. Id. at 64-65.
308. Id. at 61.
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evil specter of the “war baby” problem, Justice Kennedy laid bare his true
concerns:
Given the 9-month interval between conception and birth, it is not
always certain that a father will know that a child was conceived, nor is
it always clear that even the mother will be sure of the father’s identity.
This fact takes on particular significance in the case of a child born
overseas and out of wedlock. One concern in this context has always
been with young people, men for the most part, who are on duty with the
Armed Forces in foreign countries . . . . [I]n 1969, the year in which
Nguyen was born, there were 3,458,072 active duty military personnel,
39,506 of whom were female.
309
Extending the Court’s concerns beyond the sexual practices of the American
military, the Court went on to express a preoccupation with citizen men who go
abroad and participate in sexual tourism, stating:
The ease of travel and the willingness of Americans to visit foreign
countries have resulted in numbers of trips abroad that must be of real
concern when we contemplate the prospect of accepting petitioners’
argument, which would mandate, contrary to Congress’ wishes,
citizenship by male parentage subject to no condition save the father’s
previous length of residence in this country. In 1999 alone, Americans
made almost 25 million trips abroad, excluding trips to Canada and
Mexico. . . . Visits to Canada and Mexico add to this figure almost 34
million additional visits. . . . And the average American overseas
traveler spent 15.1 nights out of the United States in 1999. Especially in
light of the number of Americans who take short sojourns abroad, the
prospect that a father might not even know of the conception is a
realistic possibility.
310
Leaving aside the Court’s preoccupation with citizen men’s
hypermasculinity practices outside marriage in the military and in the sexual
tourism industry, the majority opinion is a case study in failing to use historical
context and anti-subordination principles when deciding equal protection cases.
The failure to historicize § 1409 allowed the Court to draw false symmetries in
power between men and women. Moreover, the failure to adopt anti-
subordination principles enabled the Court to perfect the scapegoating narrative
of the snare. In doing so, the Court obfuscated three backbone principles of the
WHP: (1) exclusion, (2) hypermasculinity, and (3) protecting innocent unwitting
male dupes from the hazards of foreign female conniving and trickery.
309. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 65 (emphasis added).
310. Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
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1. The Excludability Principle and Criminal “Half Castes”
The Court did not explicitly decide Nguyen on the grounds of Congress’s
plenary power to exclude aliens.
311
However, as in Fiallo and Miller, the Court
raised the specters of evil to reinforce the need to maintain exclusionary power.
As Collins notes, in Nguyen, the specter of evil took the form of Nguyen himself.
In the second paragraph of the body of the opinion, Justice Kennedy dog-
whistled the procedural posture of Nguyen’s case: Nguyen had been convicted
of two counts of child sexual assault and was, therefore, subject to deportation
proceedings.
312
Later in the opinion, Justice Kennedy noted again that Nguyen’s
exclusion from citizenship by any route, derivative citizenship or naturalization,
was “due to the serious nature of his criminal offenses, not to an equal protection
denial or to any supposed rigidity or harshness in the citizenship laws.”
313
In
Nguyen, the Court found its idealized facts: (1) an American military serviceman
by proxy, who had fathered a nonmarital child while abroad with a foreign
woman and (2) an exponentially undesirable racialized offspring, much better
than vast hordes of Chinese—not only foreign, but also criminal.
As Collins argues, the centrality of the petitioner’s criminality in a § 1409
case is not unique to Nguyen. Indeed, many of the § 1409 cases come before
courts in the procedural posture of deportation proceedings due to the petitioner’s
criminal conviction.
314
Part of the resiliency of § 1409 in the face of gender-
based equal protection challenges, therefore, is the perceived need to fortify the
nation’s borders against “illegitimates” who are not just racialized, but also
criminalized with an added dose of snared mothers.
315
Within the first two
paragraphs of Nguyen, Justice Kennedy mentions Nguyen’s association with
Vietnam or Vietnamese origin five times.
316
Here again, what is at stake in
§ 1409 cases is as much about race as it is about gender—policing the nation’s
white borders from racialized criminal aliens whose mothers are “loose.”
317
311. Although the Court did not explicitly decide Nguyen on plenary power grounds, many scholars
have suggested that, in fact, the plenary power was lurking in the background and also explained the
Court’s diluted version of equal protection scrutiny. See Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family,
supra note 127, at 221.
312. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57.
313. Id.; see Collins, Note,When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1700.
314. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note 127, at 196.
315. Id. at 170 (stating “the line between citizen and noncitizen was being determined not in the
abstract but in the context of the enforcement of deportation laws that were, at their different moments in
time, politically salient and legally contested.”).
316. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57.
317. Centralizing criminality to restrict immigration policies is common practice. See Dan Cadman,
Birthright Citizenship Policy Creates Downstream Problems, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Oct. 5, 2016),
http://cis.org/Cadman/Birthright-Citizenship-Policy-Creates-Downstream-Problems,
[https://perma.cc/M56D-XW2M].
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2. The Cool WHP
The absence of historical context allowed the majority to ratify the white
heteropatriarchal interests underlying § 1409 using the obfuscating glare of
neutrality dipped in nature and physiological differences. By deploying the
natural differences between men and women, the majority normalized the
operations of the statute. By grounding disparate gender treatment in nature, the
majority opinion in Nguyen, likeMiller, adhered to a tautology: women and men
are being treated differently because they are naturally different.
318
The contrasting dissenting and majority opinions in Nguyen highlight the
inadequacy of ahistorical formalist approaches to § 1409 and equal protection
jurisprudence generally.
319
Unlike the dissenting opinion, the ahistorical
formalist approach of the majority downplayed the societal policies of
discrimination that form the underbelly of § 1409. By contrast, the dissenting
opinions in both Miller, authored by Justice Ginsburg, and Nguyen, authored by
Justice O’Connor—the only two women on the Court at the time—placed the
statute in the proper historical context of supremacy, domination, and
denigration.
320
By placing the statute in the proper context of its discriminatory
past, the dissenting opinion eliminated many claims of innocence or hegemonic
goodness, like fostering relationships between the child, father, and the nation.
Rather, the dissenting opinion artfully pointed out that the history of § 1409
actively negates any claim of developing a relationship between the child, father,
and nation. In fact, it fosters the exact opposite, the prerogative of males to
discard their nonmarital offspring and to block them from inheritance and
themselves from parental accountability.
Similarly, decontextualization also allowed the majority in Nguyen to draw
false symmetries of power between men and women. According to the majority,
women, unlike men, should have the power to confer automatic citizenship
because they have the power to determine where a child is born: a pregnant
citizen mother, living abroad, can travel back to the United States and give birth
to her child in order to confer citizenship to her child.
321
Men, on the other hand,
should not be saddled with automatic citizenship because they have no
equivalent power to decide where the child is born. However, a historically
contextualized assessment of § 1409 suggests that derivative citizenship has
nothing to do with the power of women to decide the place of birth. Rather, the
need to preserve the male prerogative to confer citizenship and retain autonomy
318. Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1705.
319. See Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment, supra note 75, at 1341 (highlighting the
problems with ahistorical, decontextualized approaches to antidiscrimination law).
320. Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53, 74 (2001) (stating “[s]ex-based statutes, even when accurately reflecting
the way most men or women behave, deny individuals opportunity. Such generalizations must be viewed
not in isolation, but in the context of our Nation’s ‘long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.’”).
321. Id. at 61.
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from parenthood drives the difference in the law. It ensures, among other things,
that men can continue their hypermasculinity and sexual exploitation of foreign
women.
Despite all its obfuscating, circularity in reasoning, and immunizing, the
majority reveals its true preoccupation in two ways. First, it recognizes that
paternity tests can, in fact, eliminate fraudulent citizenship claims with scientific
accuracy, thereby defeating problems of proof. Yet, according to the Court, DNA
samples can be taken against the father’s will and “scientific proof of biological
paternity does nothing, by itself, to ensure contact between father and child.”
322
Conceding the issue of proof, the Court, therefore, reveals its real concern:
protecting male prerogative, power, and privilege. The historical contextuality
of § 1409 reveals the utter falsity of the alleged congressional interest. Far from
encouraging a relationship between father and child, § 1409’s DNA is aimed at
protecting men from their offspring and the polity from racial impurity.
323
Second, without mincing words, the majority opinion acknowledges the
traditional behavior it sought to protect: millions of incidences of
hypermasculinity. The detailed recitation of empirical evidence about
servicemen and trips out of the country, and 15.1 lonely nights—all proxies for
hypermasculine performance—clearly delineate the Court’s preoccupation with
preserving the WHP, policing the borders, and protecting the government
coffers. The majority not only shelters the rights and privileges of servicemen
and sexual tourists from constitutional scrutiny, but reifies and protects their
right to engage in hypermasculinity as a matter of legal doctrine. By assuming
the WHP as baseline, the Court protects the settled expectations of
hypermasculine sexual performance.
3. Jezebel
Nguyen marked the most elaborate use of the snare yet. Like Fiallo and
Miller, the Court made several allusions to the explicit and implicit snare:
3,418,566 active duty servicemen; 54 million good-natured Americans “willing”
to travel abroad (meaning to engage in sexual tourism), spending 15.1 lonely
nights on average outside the United States; and famously, foreign women who
do not know the identities of the fathers of their children. In perfecting Jezebel
through the snare, however, the Court performed an awe-inspiring double back-
flip from the springboard of the harlot; it held that Congress had a legitimate
interest because men required “additional biological proof of paternity to ward
off fraudulent conveyances of citizenship.”
324
Here, the Court obfuscated the
underbelly of § 1409, in not only the biological differences between the sexes
322. Id. at 55.
323. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note 127, at 170.
324. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62.
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and problems of proof, but also in characterizing the snare that commits fraud.
Here, the Court achieves the two-step process of (1) over-valorizing innocent
men, who are good-natured adventure seekers and servicemen abroad, serving
their country, and (2) pathologizing foreign women engaged in trickery against
the unwitting innocent dupes. The two-step process achieves what Zeiger calls a
concretization of the American warrior as pure and at the discretion of the foreign
woman as evil and transcended.
325
Nguyen’s majority opinion exemplifies the problems with failing to
historically contextualize and adopt anti-subordination principles when
addressing equal protection challenges. By contrast, the dissent fully
contextualized the derivative citizenship statute in its highly gender
discriminatory past. And in doing so, it made no references to the snare; instead,
the dissent applied robust scrutiny and found § 1409:
paradigmatic of a historic regime that left women with responsibility,
and freed men from responsibility, for nonmarital children. Under this
law . . . ‘when it comes to the illegitimate child, which is a great burden,
then the mother is the only recognized parent, and the father is put safely
in the background.’
326
Rather than submerging the nefarious underbelly of § 1409 in the snare, the
dissent kept a fixed gaze on the political and institutional instigators responsible
for a disparate distribution of benefits and burdens, while avoiding the use of a
universalist framework, like the natural differences between men and women.
In bothMiller andNguyen, the Supreme Court, and in particular, the military
men Justices Stevens and Kennedy, found their legal subject of choice—the
American military man who, like the American polity, must be rescued from
foreign “whores” and war babies. In both cases, the Supreme Court participated
in the racialized politics of rescuing citizen men, particularly American military
men, from the shackles of hypersexualized foreign women and their
“illegitimate” offspring. In this way, the Supreme Court engaged in what Eithne
Luibheid calls “public discourses on sexuality,” which legitimate the exclusion
and condemnation of particular migrants.
327
Drawing from Stewart Chang, the
Supreme Court has engaged in Foucault’s Panoptican, whereby spectacle and
public visibility effectuate state power over subjects through surveillance and
supervision applied by institutional mediums of state authority.
328
In bothMiller
and Nguyen, the Supreme Court created a narrative of the idealized man who
325. ZEIGER, supra note 45, at 23, 40, and 65.
326. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 92 (O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
327. Chang, supra note 38, at 268 (citing EITHNE LUIBHÉID, ENTRY DENIED: CONTROLLING
SEXUALITY AT THEBORDER 144 (2002)).
328. Id. (citing FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 34, at 200-02).
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must be rescued from the “lurking,” evil vixen. In both cases, the Supreme Court
situated foreign women in the normative pattern of the snare, who, because they
had multiple sex partners at the same time, “do not know the identities of the
father.” In both cases, the Supreme Court discursively shuts war babies out as
citizen subjects. And, in both cases, the American military man must be rescued
from the hypersexualized foreign woman in order to continue his hypersexual
conduct, tapping the WHP all the while and yet always so pure, wholesome, and
innocent. In another note of irony, the Supreme Court differentiates the lawful
immigrant subject from the excludable alien across the normative conceptions of
proper sexuality, meaning the looseness of foreign women is attributed to their
children as grounds for exclusion. Meanwhile, Johnny keeps the WHP.
329
The
logic of § 1409 does more than exclude the children; it keeps the foreign woman
fixated in the hypermasculine mind as a “slut,” perpetually prone, and not a
mother of proper American citizens.
D. Morales-Santana: Physical Presence Requirements and Johnny Meets His
Match
In a Herculean effort, after the Supreme Court rejected three opportunities
to bring § 1409 into gender equality compliance, Justice Ginsburg, writing for
the majority, masterfully situated § 1409 in its historically nefarious underbelly.
Rejecting any ahistorical formalist traditions that deplete § 1409 of its
heteropatriarchal content, Justice Ginsburg hit the nail squarely on the head,
stating, “History reveals what lurks behind § 1409.”
330
After historically
situating § 1409 in its heteropatriarchal past,
331
Justice Ginsburg took a scalpel
to the institutional question that had plagued constitutional challenges to § 1409
in the past: specifically, whether the plenary power doctrine immunized § 1409
from a more exacting scrutiny.
332
Distinguishing the Fiallo line of reasoning that
Congress acted within its plenary power, Justice Ginsburgmaintained that Fiallo
applied to immigration preferences whereas Morales-Santana involved a claim
of citizenship at birth.
333
Rather than take the historical freeze-frame approach
to § 1409, which facilitated obfuscation, circularity, and entrenchment, Justice
Ginsburg reached the merits of Morales-Santana’s gender disparity claim and
found § 1409 constitutionally infirm. The remedy meted out by the Court,
however, joined a long tradition of burdening women and preserving white
heteropatriarchal privilege in an effort to achieve gender symmetry.
334
Rather
329. Id. at 266.
330. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2017).
331. Id. at 1689 (2017) (stating “[s]ections 1401 and 1409, we note, date from an era when the law
books of our Nation were rife with overbroad generalizations about the way men and women are”).
332. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note 127, at 194.
333. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1694.
334. See Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note 127, at 221.
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than extend the more lenient residency requirement to both mothers and fathers,
the Court applied the more onerous standard to both.
Like Nguyen, Luis Ramón Morales-Santana presented the problem of a
racialized criminal in the procedural posture of a deportation proceeding.
335
Morales-Santana was a nonmarital foreign born child, born in the Dominican
Republic to a Dominican mother and a citizen father.
336
The version of the
derivative citizenship statute applicable to Morales-Santana mandated that, prior
to his birth, his citizen father had to be physically present in the United States for
five years, at least five of which were after his citizen father was fourteen.
337
By
contrast, the physical presence requirement for noncitizenmothers was one year.
Morales-Santana’s citizen father missed satisfying the physical presence
requirement by a mere twenty days.
338
Morales-Santana filed an equal protection
claim challenging the gender disparity in the physical presence requirement.
339
After saturating the physical presence requirement in § 1409’s discriminatory
history, the Court applied heightened scrutiny, and summarily rejected the
government’s specious justifications that the requirement ensured a connection
between the child and citizen father and prevented statelessness for the child. By
way of remedy, however, the Court applied the more onerous standard to both
men and women.
1. Whiteness
In eliminating plenary power applicability to § 1409, Justice Ginsburg
created an opening for heightened scrutiny, specifically on issues of gender, but
perhaps also on future claims involving nationality and race. The genesis of
§ 1409’s more extensive physical presence requirement in the Nationality Act of
1940 was Congress’s effort to reduce the number of Chinese and Mexican
citizenship claims under the derivative citizenship statute.
340
Although Justice
Ginsburg did not linger on the racialized history of § 1409, arguably because the
case directly addressed gender disparity, she did note that the Roosevelt
Administration “[f]ear[ed] that a foreign-born child could turn out ‘more alien
than American in character.’”
341
More importantly, as Kristin Collins notes,
when Justice Ginsburg dismissed the plenary power line of reasoning, she
undermined the kinds of racial purity arguments that the government had
steadfastly maintained during Fiallo and all three of the equal protection cases
335. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1688.
336. Id. at 1686.
337. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 601(g) (1940) (now known as § 301(g) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, current version at § 1401(g)). Currently, the requirement is five years pre-birth, two of which are
after the citizen father turns 14.
338. Id. at 1686.
339. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1409, §§ 301(a)(7), 309(a).
340. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note 127, at 184.
341. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1692.
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involving § 1409 prior to Morales-Santana.
342
In Morales-Santana, by way of
illustration, the Solicitor General argued that given The Chinese Exclusion Case,
the derivative citizenship was a form of naturalization and “the power to confer
or deny citizenship on individuals born abroad . . . is also an aspect of the power
to exclude aliens from the Nation”
343
—a power that “is an incident of every
independent nation” and “a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the
Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.”
344
Although Justice Ginsburg did not expressly address this argument, she
distinguished Fiallo and its application to § 1409, shrewdly laying a foundation
for heightened scrutiny in the future.
345
2. The Maintenance of WHP Privilege
Throughout the opinion, Justice Ginsburg was highly critical of the sexism
animating § 1409, particularly the idea that “[i]n marriage, the husband is
dominant, wife subordinate; unwed mother is the natural and sole guardian of a
nonmarital child.”
346
According to the Court, “lump characterizations” that
“unwed fathers care little about, indeed are strangers to, their children” “no
longer passes equal protection inspection.”
347
Perhaps,Morales-Santana signals
the first chink in the armor of the WHP, laying the foundation for future
challenges. However, what the Court gives with one hand, it takes with the other.
Rather than disturbing the statutory scheme that sustains a white
heteropatriarchal property right in philandering, sexual exploitation, and rape,
the majority opinion applied the more burdensome physical presence
requirement applicable to fathers to mothers. The Court could have nullified the
more burdensome requirement and applied the more lenient requirement to both
mothers and fathers. In explaining the Court’s decision to apply the more
burdensome physical presence requirement on both fathers and mothers, the
Court cited congressional intent and stated that Congress would not have
intended application of the more lenient rule to both citizen fathers and
mothers.
348
342. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note 127, at 184.
343. Brief for Petitioner at 15, Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (No. 15-1191), 2016
WL 4436132, at *15.
344. Id.
345. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note 127, at 184.
346. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1690.
347. Id. at 1695.
348. Id. at 1701.
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3. Evil Foreign Woman as Snare Finally Put to Rest (At Least
Temporarily, in the Majority Opinion inMorales-Santana)
Gratefully, the majority opinion did not engage in any of the previous dog-
whistling about evil foreign women as Aristotelian snare and hypersexualized
narratives regarding foreign women that justify the WHP. The Court’s effective
use of historical context negated the evil specter of the snare. Although the Court
was highly critical of the gender implications of the statute, it did not grapple
with the racial content of § 1409, let alone the Supreme Court’s materialized
animus against foreign women or its self-serving narratives about the
untrustworthiness of foreign women. Setting aside the issue of whether Congress
would eliminate the longer physical presence requirement, extending the less
onerous standard to both citizen men and women would rightfully undermine a
broader statutory scheme animated by white heteropatriarchal property rights in
hypermasculine sexual performance.
349
Such an approach could acknowledge
the intersectional past of § 1409 and explicitly reject its white heteropatriarchal
interests. As the Court keenly recognized, “[N]ew insights and societal




“T]he misfortune of an illegitimate birth cannot deprive a man of his
nationality . . . . He is a part of society.”
351
Section 1409 is anathema in a nation that pledges allegiance to the values of
a free and democratic society committed to treating each person with equal
concern and respect under the law. If a measure of democratic governance is to
protect individuals against wrongful discrimination and ensure that all
individuals are treated alike in the eyes of the law, § 1409 is incomprehensible.
Section 1409 allocates the precious resource of citizenship impermissibly on the
grounds of nationality, gender, and marital status. The rugged history of
§ 1409 demonstrates the entrenchment of using matrilineage coupled with the
absence of citizenship to create precarity, particularly for the purpose of
hypermasculinity. The history of § 1409 fails to suggest justifications based on
the problems of proving paternity or fostering ties between an abandoned child
and the father or this nation.
352
Rather, the history of § 1409 establishes that what
349. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family, supra note 127, at 217-18.
350. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1690 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603
(2015)).
351. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2165 (citing Letter from John Russell Young,
U.S. Legation, Peking, China, to Charles Seymour, U.S. Consul, Canton, China (Feb. 23, 1885)).
352. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 6, at 2138.
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is at stake is the nation’s interest in guarding its white borders and coffers
353
from
undesirable foreign others and regulating the sexuality of men and women; it
gives men autonomy, where it sanctions women.
354
Section 1409 is a deliberately
induced process for pleasure that wreaks hazards in precarity.
In this section, I propose three solutions: (1) introducing automatic
citizenship for both men and women for their nonmarital foreign-born children,
(2) bringing § 1409 into moral, legal accountability, and equality symmetry with
abortion rights cases, and (3) emphasizing the need to gather evidence to
substantiate claims for race and national origin discrimination.
A. Automatic Citizenship for Children of Citizen Men and Women
The children of both men and women should have automatic derivative
citizenship. The elimination of male prerogative in § 1409 would establish
symmetry in morality, legal accountability, and equality. Automatic citizenship
for the children of both men and women would equalize treatment between men
and women, eliminate the WHP, and establish symmetry in treatment between
foreign women and American women, as well as the children of citizen mothers
and fathers. As Isabel Medina argues, the willing citizen mother or the willing
citizen father would have the right to transmit citizenship with ease.
355
At the
same time, neither would be able to so easily escape parental
responsibilities.
356
Although some might argue that maintaining automatic
derivative citizenship for women may continue to saddle them with reproductive
burden, such arguments support the need to maintain reproductive freedom for
women, not the gender asymmetry in § 1409.
Congress should not create a system that empowers men to discard their
children, equips men to abandon their children after engaging in unprotected
hypermasculinity, or devises institutional conditions for precarity. The political
rhetoric surrounding abortion rights and reproductive punishment may have
some application here: If these fathers do not want the responsibilities of
children, they should refrain from making them. The prospect of parenthood
might also produce more responsible sexual behavior. The same solution would
also greatly reduce fraudulent paternity and citizenship claims. As argued by the
353. Collins, Note,When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties, supra note 36, at 1691 (citing Miller
v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 432 n.9 (1998) (Stevens, J.) (plurality opinion)) (noting that “one explanation
for the limitations on fathers’ right to transmit citizenship is to minimize the financial burden on the
states”).
354. Id.; see alsoMariella, supra note 36, at 227 (“The effect of the distinction therefore encourages
men to conceive children outside of marriage, and compels women to bear the costs and the stigma of
non-marital sex alone when men are unwilling to do so.”).
355. Mariella, supra note 36, at 227.
356. Id. at 258.
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dissent in Nguyen, if the underlying reasoning was the difficulty of determining
paternity, increases in technology have negated that impossibility.
357
In proposing the solution of symmetry in automatic citizenship, I draw
partially from Martha Fineman’s vulnerability theory to this extent: If the state
systemically excludes you from citizenship, from the means of inheriting
and owning property, from wealth, humanity, personhood, and basic resources,
then the state has a heightened duty to make you whole and to provide access to
the sanctioned mechanism of reliance and resilience.
358
Congress,
through § 1409, has created a right in citizen men that mitigates rights in their
children and the mothers of their children, while simultaneously creating the
conditions of precarity. Congress has created clear privileges and equally
distinct vulnerabilities that perpetuate inequitable institutional practices and
operations. Having created these conditions, Congress should abolish them.
359
B. Immoral Asymmetry, Legal Hypocrisy, and Foreign Lives Matter
The inconsistencies in morality, legal accountability, and equality that
§ 1409 creates are legion. Section 1409 signals to the world that the interest men
may have in hypermasculinity outweighs the value of life and that the price of a
frolic is worth the expense of mass destruction. In the context of nonmarital
foreign-born children, § 1409 suggests that a foreign woman is good enough to
sexually exploit, but not good enough to create citizens.
360
Inside America, a
357. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 80.
358. Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, and Multiple Identities, 13 NEV. L.J. 619,
636–39 (2013).
359. As for arguments related to scarcity, lack of resources, overburdening the government coffers,
and administrative difficulty, such rebuttals conflate substance and procedure. Difficulty does not qualify
the legitimacy or the importance of symmetry between citizen men and women, citizen and foreign
women, and between the children of foreign women and citizen women, as well as eliminating a right that
functions like a property right to engage in unprotected hypermasculinity with foreign women free from
the responsibilities of parenthood. Moreover, the United States had abundant resources when a
Republican-controlled Congress and President Donald Trump exacted a nearly $1.5 trillion tax cut
package that mainly benefitted the wealthy. In 2018, the top-earning 1 percent of households—those
earning more than $607,000 a year—will pay a combined $111 billion less in 2018 in federal taxes than
they would have if the laws had remained unchanged since 2000. Steve Wamhoff & Matthew Gardner,
Federal Tax Cuts in the Bush, Obama, and Trump Years, INST. ON TAX’N&ECON. (July 11, 2018),
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is more than the tax cut received over the same period by the entire bottom60 percent of earners, according
to an analysis in the process of being published. Id. A July 2018 report tallied all the major federal tax
cuts and tax increases since 2000. Cumulatively, the top 1 percent of earners have received 22 percent of
all tax cuts during that period; the top 20 percent of earners (those earning more than $111,000) have
received 65 percent of tax cuts. Id. Similarly, at the time of writing, the Trump Administration is
considering bypassing Congress to grant another $100 billion tax cut mainly for the wealthy. Alan
Rappeport & Jim Tankersley, Trump Administration Mulls a Unilateral Tax Cut for the Rich, N.Y. TIMES
(July 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/30/us/politics/trump-tax-cuts-rich.html [https://per
ma.cc/VQ55-TAXB].
360. Dorothy E. Roberts,Who May Give Birth to United States Citizens?, 17 WOMEN’SRTS. L. REP.
275 (explaining that a state referendum to deny undocumented immigrants jus soli citizenship signals that
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woman’s right to choose and to be free from reproductive punishment may be in
jeopardy. Outside America, men can discard human life freely. Inside America,
lawmakers put women in jail for giving birth to drug-dependent children, but
allow men to discard their nonmarital children abroad at their whim. Inside
America, the Fourteenth Amendment eliminates a caste system where some
persons born in the country are citizens, but some are not.
361
Outside America,
Congress has created a caste system for children based on the sex, nationality,
and marital status of their parents. Both Congress and the courts can see the
sanctity of human life and the responsibilities of parenthood when controlling
women’s bodies, but not men’s. Both the Court and Congress can see life within
the nation’s boundaries. Neither the Court nor Congress can see the value of
human life beyond its borders when mothers are unwed and foreign and fathers
are Johnny Appleseed. If we, as a society, hold mothers criminally accountable
for giving birth to drug-dependent children, we should extend the same
morality and legal accountability to American men traveling abroad and
discarding their children. Conversely, if Congress will allow American men to
travel abroad and father children and discard them, then lawmakers should
refrain from holding women accountable for birthing drug-dependent
children.
362
The history of § 1409 and its justifications bring into sharp relief the Court’s
hypocrisy as to the sanctity of human life and parenthood. There should be
uniformity, symmetry, and consistency in morality and the value of life in
abortion politics, the transferal of citizenship, and criminal prosecutions of
mothers whose children are born dependent upon illicit substances. If both
Congress and the courts can only see the value of life and the sanctity of
parenthood when exerting control over a woman’s body, and are blind to the
value of life and sanctity of parenthood when fathers are philanderers and
mothers are foreign and unwed, then perhaps Congress and the courts are not
really interested in life or parenthood, but rather controlling women’s bodies and
preserving male prerogative, power, and privilege. Life is no more or less
precious when it is made within the borders or beyond them. It is no more or less
sacred when made with two citizens or one.
C. Gathering Evidence About Disparate Impact Based on Race and Nationality
It is beyond the scope of this paper to argue that, given the property interest
in citizenship, the denial of jus sanguinis birthright citizenship to nonmarital
Americans believe undocumented workers are good enough to exploit, but are not good enough to be
citizens).
361. Id.
362. The inherent ironies in morality, legal accountability, and inequality between § 1409 and the
criminal prosecutions of mothers who give birth to drug-dependent children are the subjects of another
piece of upcoming scholarship.
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foreign-born children of American fathers triggers a violation under the Due
Process Clause, subject to strict scrutiny analysis. Similarly, it is beyond the
scope of this paper to answer whether a disparate impact claim based on the race
or nationality of nonmarital foreign-born children or their mothers is an effective
vehicle for exposing the discriminatory animus underlying § 1409 or whether
disparate impact analysis has been so thoroughly gutted as to make such an effort
futile. At a minimum, as Isabel Medina argues, disaggregated data
is fundamentally necessary from federal agencies determining derivative
citizenship claims by the race, nationality, gender, and marital status of
applicants and whether the application is rejected or approved.
363
Fundamental
equality, justice, and fairness require documenting the impact of race, national
origin, gender, and marital status on the derivative citizenship decision-making
process.
364
As Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion inMorales-
Santana demonstrates, § 1409 requires a thorough vettingwithin its raced, sexed,
and classed historical context under a robust strict scrutiny to prevent spurious
justifications, hegemonic feats of replicating inequality in the baseline, and
drawing false symmetries in power between men and women, all in an effort
to perpetuate hypermasculine conduct and regimes of sexual subordination.
CONCLUSION
Congress, with the Supreme Court’s blessing, has created a white
heteropatriarchal property right in philandering, sexual exploitation, and rape. In
doing so, Congress has given men a right that suppresses any duty owed to their
children or to the mothers of their children: They can discard them. As the
Supreme Court sits perched and ready to roll back the tide of women’s
reproductive autonomy and undermine the integrity of Roe v. Wade, let it extend
its moralizing about the responsibilities of parenthood, sexually responsible
behavior, and the sanctity of human life to the inestimable numbers of children
Americans have fathered and discarded. Congress, the courts, policymakers, and
administrators have all seen fit to give men a right, amounting to a property right,
to father children abroad and abandon them. Rather than subject this practice to
the exacting, antiseptic light of day, the Court has ratified and reified this right
over centuries of doctrine.
For some, the words of Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott will appear
shocking to the conscience, antiquated, and unfathomable. The day will come,
however, when we look back on § 1409 with the same wonder. Future
generations, as well as the current generation, must fundamentally
363. Medina, Derivative Citizenship, supra note 149, at 444.
364. Id.
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understand: “Power concedes nothing without a demand.”
365
Power is neither
natural nor inevitable. It is made. And it can be unmade.
365. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, Speech Before the West Indian Emancipation Society, in TWO
SPEECHES BY FREDERICK DOUGLASS 22 (Rochester, N.Y., C.P. Dewey 1857).
